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In this thesis, I study the impact of institutional owners on corporate tax avoidance. Whereas 
the public discussion regarding the subject is often about tax avoidance scandals and the fear 
of institutional investors being bad owners – the business world sees tax avoidance as a natural 
part of the business. This study defines tax avoidance broadly as any activity that reduces 
explicit taxes. Furthermore, tax avoidance is divided into nonconforming and conforming tax 
avoidance. Nonconforming tax avoidance originates from the differences in book and tax rules. 
If no such differences existed, all tax avoidance would be conforming.  
Findings of prior literature are partly contradictory. Those studies that find the relationship 
of institutional owners and corporate tax avoidance to be negative highlight the importance of 
long investment horizon and corporate governance. As for the opposite studies, they regard 
institutions’ monitoring abilities and better knowledge of effective tax planning to play an 
important role. The contradictory results of prior research, the increasing share of the 
institutional owners, and the public concern of institutions being bad owners motivate this 
study. 
The research data is collected from the Compustat and Thomson Reuters databases. After 
processing the data, the resulting sample consists of between 8,624 and 6,686 firm-year 
observations depending on the tax avoidance measure in the period 2011-2015. 
As in the prior studies, also the results of this thesis are partly contradictory. I find weak 
evidence that the institutional ownership is negatively related to the corporate nonconforming 
tax avoidance. The results for conforming tax avoidance, on the other hand, slightly indicate 
that firms with more institutional shareholders engage in more conforming tax avoidance. 
Intriguing results come up related to the number of institutional investors. The results indicate 
that firms with less than forty different institutional blockholders engage in more 
nonconforming tax avoidance. It is consistent with my expectations that firms with fewer 
institutional owners are less exposed to the free-rider problem, and hence those firms benefit 
more from the institutions’ monitoring abilities and better knowledge of effective tax planning. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Käsittelen tässä gradussa sitä, miten institutionaalinen omistaja vaikuttaa yrityksen verojen 
välttelyyn. Julkinen keskustelu aiheesta liittyy usein verojen välttelyskandaaleihin ja pelkoon 
siitä, että institutionaalinen sijoittaja saattaa olla piittaamaton omistaja. Yritysmaailma sen 
sijaan näkee verojen välttelyn luonnollisena osana bisnestä. Tämä tutkimus määrittelee 
verojen välttelyn laajasti tarkoittamaan mitä tahansa toimintaa, joka vähentää yritykseen 
kohdistuvaa tuloveroa tai muuta suoraa veroa. Lisäksi verojen välttely jaetaan nonconforming 
(verojen välttely johtaa eroavuuteen kirjanpidollisessa ja verotuksellisessa tuloksessa) ja 
conforming verojen välttelyyn (verostrategian toteuttaminen vaikuttaa samalla tavalla 
kirjanpidolliseen ja verotukselliseen tulokseen). 
Aiemman tutkimuksen tulokset ovat keskenään ristiriitaisia. Tutkimukset, joiden mukaan 
institutionaalisen sijoittajan ja yrityksen verojen maksun suhde on positiivinen, painottavat 
pitkän sijoitustähtäimen ja hyvän hallitustavan merkitystä. Vastakkaista tulosta näyttävät 
tutkimukset puolestaan näkevät instituutioiden monitorointikyvyt ja paremman 
verosuunnittelutietämyksen olevan merkittäviä selittäjiä. Tätä gradua motivoivat paitsi 
edellisten tutkimusten ristiriitaiset tulokset, myös institutionaalisten omistajien kasvava osuus 
ja yleinen epäilys institutionaalisen sijoittajan taipumuksesta olla huono omistaja.   
Tutkimusdata kerätään Compustat- ja Thomson Reuters -tietokannoista. Datan 
prosessoinnin jälkeen jäljelle jää 6,686-8,624 yritys-vuosi havaintoa riippuen käytetystä 
verojen välttelyn mittarista. Otanta koskee vuosia 2011-2015. 
Samoin kuin edeltävä tutkimus, myös tämän tutkimuksen tulokset ovat jossain määrin 
ristiriitaisia. Tutkimustulokset antavat heikon tuen sille, että institutionaalisen omistajan ja 
yrityksen nonconforming-verojen välttelyn suhde olisi negatiivinen. Vastaavasti, tulokset 
antavat pientä tukea sille, että yritykset, joissa on enemmän institutionaalisia sijoittajia, 
välttelevät enemmän veroja conforming -määritelmän mukaisesti. Mielenkiintoisia tuloksia 
saadaan liittyen yrityksen verojen välttelyn ja institutionaalisten sijoittajien määrään liittyen. 
Tulokset näyttävät, että yritykset, joissa on alle neljäkymmentä eri institutionaalista sijoittajaa, 
välttelevät enemmän veroja (nonconforming). Tulos on odotusten mukainen: yritykset, jotka 
ovat tarpeeksi harvan eri instituution omistuksessa, kärsivät vähemmän vapaamatkustajan 
ongelmasta. Tällaiset yritykset siis hyötyvät enemmän instituutioiden kyvystä monitoroida ja 
tehdä tehokasta verosuunnittelua. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis studies how institutional investors affect corporate tax avoidance. The subject is 
rather new in the field of accounting research, which makes it a fairly topical issue. The 
introduction chapter will present the background, research method, main findings and key 
limitations for the thesis. Lastly, the structure of the thesis is more closely examined. 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The public discussion about tax payments of individuals and companies has been vivid in the 
recent years. Scandals seem to follow one another: the Panama Papers, Apple’s tax avoidance 
activities in Europe, and tax avoidance of welfare and health companies in Finland, just to 
mention few.  
Tax avoidance is not a new phenomenon, though. As long ago as thirty years back, evidence of 
corporate tax avoidance led to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the U.S. (McIntyre et al. 2014). 
What is new is that companies have become more and more multinational, which means that 
they have also become more heterogeneous. Multinational corporations cross jurisdictions, and 
by simply assuming that they pay taxes where they create profits may subsequently 
underestimate the real picture. Governments still want to be able to collect taxes where the real 
money is created, but in the modern, global and digital economy it seems to be an impossible 
task. In Finland, for instance, the government is looking for neutral corporate taxation that would 
not skew corporate decision making (VATT 2016). However, finding such a solution is not an 
easy task. 
In contrast to the public discussion, the business world sees tax avoidance as a natural part of 
the business. The government takes more than one-third of the firm’s pre-tax profits (Chen et 
al. 2010). Taken into consideration the significance of the tax cost to the firm and its 
shareholders, corporate tax planning could be naturally expected by shareholders. One euro 
saved in taxes is one euro more profits for shareholders. The idea of corporate tax savings being 
a transfer of value from the state to shareholders may be oversimplified but intuitively 
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understandable (see e.g. Rego 2003; Desai & Dharmapala 2009; Frank et al. 2009; McGuire et 
al. 2014). 
Previous research has not been able to categorize firms based on their tax avoidance behavior. 
It is difficult to define the dividing line between, for instance, aggressive and non-aggressive, 
or responsible and irresponsible corporate tax avoidance. Instead, broad definitions for tax 
avoidance are used. This study follows Hanlon and Heitzman’s (2010) definition of tax 
avoidance as any activity reducing explicit taxes. They model tax avoidance as a continuum of 
tax planning strategies where in one end is something very legal strategies like municipal bond 
investments. Closer to the other end are more aggressive or suspicious strategies like tax 
sheltering. Tax planning is anywhere along the continuum, meaning any activity reducing 
corporate tax payments. So, instead of drawing lines between responsible and irresponsible 
corporate tax payers, firms could be placed along the continuum depending on their tax 
payments. It is in the eye of the beholder where the line is drawn.  
The prior research has mainly concentrated on nonconforming tax avoidance, which refers to 
cases in which tax avoidance transactions are accounted differently for book and tax purposes. 
Conforming tax avoidance, on the other hand, means that financial accounting income is 
reduced when a tax strategy is employed. (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) 
Tax avoidance research has sought to identify firm-level characteristics that affect corporate tax 
avoidance. Desai and Dharmapala (2008) argue that the nature of ownership patterns may have 
implications for the workings of tax policy, and Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) call for more 
research on the subject.  
The earliest research about how ownership affects corporate tax avoidance compared public and 
private ownerships (e.g. Beatty and Harris 1998; Mikhail 1999; Mills & Newberry 2001). More 
recently, the research has concentrated on the impact of family-ownership (Chen et al. 2010), 
hedge fund activists (Cheng et a. 2012), dual-class stock (McGuire et al. 2014) and the 
separation of ownership and control (Badertscher et al. 2013) on corporate tax practices.  
The most recent research branch has focused on the influence of institutional ownership on 
corporate tax avoidance. The results have been partly contradictory. Khurana and Moser (2013) 
and Hasan et al. (2016) find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with tax 
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avoidance. They highlight the importance of investment horizon and corporate governance as 
explanations for the results. Instead, Chen et al. (2015), Khan et al. (2016), and Bird and Karolyi 
(2017) find a positive association between institutional investors and corporate tax avoidance. 
They emphasize the facts that institutions bring tax planning knowledge and monitoring abilities 
to their target firms, making the tax planning of the firms more effective. However, the latter 
mentioned three research papers have some contradictory results with each other regarding the 
role of corporate governance and the use of tax shelters on tax avoidance practices. 
The public discussion often highlights the fear that institutional investors may weaken the 
governance and performance of their target firms: 
“There was not much sign of scrutiny or wealth creation in fiascos like Enron and Lehman 
Brothers. Governance has been weakened by the rise of passive index funds, which means that 
many firms’ largest shareholders are software programs.” (The Economist 2015) 
Since institutional investors own now around 80 percent of all stocks in S&P500 (Elhauge 
2016), the concern of institutional shareholders being bad owners should be taken seriously. 
However, the research results suggest that the concern is overstated: institutional investors seem 
to positively influence the governance of the firms, and they are good at monitoring, which leads 
to improved performance of the firms (e.g. Brav et al. 2008, Appel et al. 2016). Still it is true 
that institutions may value short-term over long-term, which may lead to higher tax avoidance, 
or that firms with multiple institutional blockholders may have a free-rider problem, which 
means that each investor individually has insufficient incentives to bear the cost of monitoring 
(Grossman and Hart 1980), which in turn may lead to lower tax avoidance. 
All the three aspects – (1) the contradictory results of prior corporate tax avoidance and 
institutional investor research, (2) the increasing share of institutional owners, and (3) the strong 
public concern of institutional investors being bad owners - suggest that more research is 
needed. This study contributes to the emerging literature on the impact of ownership on 
corporate tax practices by studying the role of institutional owners.  
1.2 Research problem and method 
Based on the theoretical framework, three main hypotheses were developed. 
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H1a: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit higher levels of nonconforming tax 
avoidance. 
H1b: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit lower levels of nonconforming tax 
avoidance. 
H2a: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit higher levels of conforming tax 
avoidance. 
H2b: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit lower levels of conforming tax 
avoidance. 
H3: Firms with multiple institutional shareholders exhibit lower levels of tax avoidance. 
To examine the hypotheses - the tax avoidance of the firms owned by institutional investors - I 
rely on multiple measures of tax avoidance drawn from prior literature. Specifically, I use two 
effective tax rate measures, CASH_ETR and GAAP_ETR, and a book-tax difference measure, 
BTD, to capture nonconforming tax avoidance, and one measure for conforming tax avoidance. 
Firms that engage in more tax avoidance have lower effective tax rates, and higher book-tax 
differences and a higher value for the conforming tax avoidance measure. I rely on prior research 
also in the selection of control variables. Furthermore, I include two test variables related to the 
role institutional investors: a percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares owned by institutional 
investors, and a dummy variable for the number of institutional blockholders. I estimate the 
resulting model using ordinary least squares regression. 
I use a research sample of between 8,624 and 6,686 firm-year observations depending on the 
measure of tax avoidance in the period 2011-2015. I gather the data from Compustat and 
Thomson Reuters databases, so the data concerns U.S. firms.  
1.3 Main results 
The first results show how the percentage of the firm’s stock owned by institutions is related to 
the firm’s tax avoidance. Nonconforming tax avoidance is tested by two effective tax rate 
measures, CASH_ETR and GAAP_ETR, and a book tax difference, BTD. Conforming tax 
avoidance is tested by only one measure, CONFORMING_TAX. 
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My findings related to the corporate nonconforming tax avoidance are mixed: two of the 
measures, GAAP_ETR and BTD, show decreased tax avoidance, whereas CASH_ETR gives 
contradictory results. That is, GAAP_ETR and BTD show that when the part of the firm’s shares 
owned by institutions increases, the firm engages in less tax avoidance, whereas results of the 
CASH_ETR indicate the opposite. A potential explanation for the contradictory results is that 
the CASH_ETR differs from the two others in three important ways: it does not reflect 
accounting accruals, it is not straightly computable by jurisdictions, and it is the most volatile 
of the three measures. The reasoning noticed, I interpret the results to give a slight support for 
the hypothesis 1b. However, this interpretation should be considered carefully, and more 
research is needed to truly prove it. 
Moreover, the results indicate that profitable, growing and leveraged firms tend to engage in 
more nonconforming tax avoidance. Also, firms that have more property, plant and equipment 
to assets, firms with loss carryforwards available in the beginning of the year, and firms that 
have more advertisement and R&D expenditure seem to be more aggressive in nonconforming 
tax avoidance.  
My findings related to the corporate conforming tax avoidance indicate that institutional 
shareholders are slightly associated with corporate conforming tax avoidance.  
Most of the control variables indicate that firms usually engage adversely in nonconforming and 
conforming tax avoidance. Only profitable firms and firms with loss carryforwards available in 
the beginning of the year exhibit higher levels of both nonconforming and conforming tax 
avoidance.   
My last finding differs from the above in that the effect of institutional owners on the firm’s tax 
avoidance is measured by a dummy variable, InstOwn_dum, which is set to one if the firm’s 
stock is owned by less than forty different institutional owners. The results suggest that firms 
with less than forty different institutional shareholders exhibit higher levels of nonconforming 
tax avoidance. It is consistent with my expectations that firms with fewer blockholders are less 
exposed to the free-rider problem, and hence those firms benefit more from the knowledgeable 
institutional shareholders and their monitoring of the firms’ managers.  
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1.4 Key limitations 
I identify three key limitations which can possibly skew the results or limit the generalization 
of the results. First of all, endogeneity of institutional ownership could be a problem of this 
thesis as it may have been of some prior papers as well. For instance, the paper of Khurana and 
Moser (2013), was criticized by Khan et al. (2016) who argue that Khurana and Moser failed to 
control the endogeneity of institutional ownership. Since my empirical setting is quite close to 
that of Khurana and Moser, the same concerns could be addressed to my empirical setting. 
Second, I use comparatively short sample period of five years. This is to keep the thesis to its 
scope. Also, my choice to use the period 2011-2015 may color the results since it is a period 
straight after the financial crisis that started in 2007-2008. However, I try to interpret the results 
accordingly. 
Third, because I use ETRs, my research sample consists only of firms with positive pretax 
income. This creates a potential sample selection bias because the sample excludes loss firm-
year observations. However, all studies using one-year ETR as a proxy for tax avoidance are 
subject to this limitation. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. First of all, I will focus on the literature review 
in chapters two and three. The chapters introduce the core concepts, definitions, and main 
previous research papers related to my study. The chapters create the theoretical framework 
which helps the reader to understand the empirical part, especially the result interpretation and 
analysis. The chapter two concentrates on the theoretical framework of tax avoidance, whereas 
the chapter three focuses on institutional investor as an owner. Based on the literature covered 
in the chapters two and three, hypotheses are developed in chapter four as if proposed 
explanations for the corporate tax avoidance phenomenon.  
Chapters five and six compose the empirical part of the thesis. In the chapter five I present my 
research sample, and the regression model I use to examine institutional ownership in relation 
to corporate tax avoidance. The dependent, test and control variables used in the regression are 
exhaustively presented.  The chapter six concentrates first on describing my sample: statistics 
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of the variables, industry statistics of the sample, and correlations of the coefficients are 
presented. After that, I present and discuss my regression results, and introduce two additional 
tests I conducted to assess the consistency and robustness of the results. 
Chapter seven concludes the thesis; in this chapter I try to go deeper in the analysis compared 
to the empirical part’s analysis, and put the results into a wider concept. Conclusions include a 
summary of the findings, contributions to the existing literature, managerial implications, and, 
finally, few propositions of further research topics.  
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2 TAX AVOIDANCE 
In this chapter, tax avoidance is defined. Then, tax avoidance is divided into nonconforming and 
conforming tax avoidance, and the both concepts are widely examined. After that, previous 
research on the determinants of corporate tax avoidance are presented with the help of three 
subcategories: traditional determinants, agency framework and ownership patterns. These 
subcategories should include all the main determinants of corporate tax avoidance that prior 
research has recognized. Moreover, the studies related to the impact of institutional ownership 
on corporate tax avoidance are more closely inspected.  
2.1 Definition of tax avoidance 
The chapter introduces the definition of corporate tax avoidance. In the following chapters, 
when tax avoidance is mentioned, it refers to the concept defined in this chapter 2.1. 
Initially, taxes were created to offer financial support for citizens’ needs. They are also a 
fundamental vehicle to redistribute wealth and promote equality between citizens. (David & 
Abreu 2008) Tax laws are still designed to redistribute public sector’s financing fairly 
(Knuutinen 2013). It is often regarded morally wrong that and individual or a firm receives 
benefits of the state without paying taxes (David & Abreu 2008).  
However, taxpayers often try to minimize their tax payments to the state (e.g. Desai & 
Dharmapala 2006). The challenge for the research is that there are no universally accepted 
definitions for tax planning, tax avoidance, tax aggressiveness, or tax evasion. The different 
terms include both acceptable and unacceptable tax planning activities in the viewpoint of the 
government (Knuutinen 2013). Most of the sheltering activities, for instance, include many 
complicated steps that may individually examined seem perfectly legal, but the overall result 
might be egregious (Weisbach 2003).  
The absence of universally accepted terms has led to a situation where researchers use very 
broad terms for tax avoidance and its related terms. Dyreng et al. (2008, p. 62), for instance, 
argue that “there are many areas in which the law is unclear, particularly for complex 
transactions, and firms may take positions on their returns in which the ultimate tax outcome is 
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uncertain”, and based on the argument they define tax avoidance as “anything that reduces the 
firm’s cash effective tax rate”.  
This study follows Hanlon and Heitzman’s (2010) broad definition of tax avoidance as an 
activity of reducing explicit taxes. The definition includes tax-favored real activities, tax-
reduction-aimed avoidance activities, as well as tax benefits from lobbying activities. Figure 1 
models the definition of Hanlon and Heizman where tax avoidance is a continuum of tax 
planning strategies. Perfectly legal strategies like municipal bond investments are in one end, 
and more aggressive strategies like sheltering are closer to the other end. As Hanlon and 
Heizman point out, different people would have different opinions of where the line of 
aggressive tax planning should be drawn.  
FIGURE 1. Tax avoidance continuum. 
 
Tax avoidance can happen in only one year or over many years. The study of Dyreng et al. 
(2008) suggests that many firms are able to avoid taxes over long periods of time. In their 
research sample one-fourth of firms are able to maintain long-run cash effective tax rate below 
20 percent. This study will not try to distinguish short-term tax avoidance from long-term tax 
avoidance. 
2.2 Practices of tax avoidance 
In addition to defining the term tax avoidance, it is also important to define what such an activity 
particularly includes. By shortly going through and defining some of the typical strategies the 
study makes sure that the reader has clear understanding on the issues, and that the 
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understanding is not barely based on the public discussion. In this study, corporate tax avoidance 
is divided into nonconforming and conforming tax avoidance.  
2.2.1 Nonconforming tax avoidance 
This chapter defines what nonconforming tax avoidance means. Because the concept is rather 
difficult, it also makes the chapter relatively long. First, I go through the factors that make the 
book income differ from taxable income. Then, I shortly talk about aggressive reporting, which 
is a vague phenomenon as it lacks theoretical evidence. Finally, few interesting findings of prior 
research about firms’ nonconforming tax avoidance practices are presented. 
Nonconforming tax avoidance refers to tax avoidance transactions that are accounted differently 
for book and tax purposes (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). In other words, when a nonconforming 
tax strategy is employed, book income increases more than taxable income.  
Book vs tax rules 
In their broad review of accounting for income taxes, Graham et al. (2012) identify two sources 
for differences in book and tax income: temporary and permanent differences. Temporary 
differences occur when both financial and tax accounting recognize the same amount of income 
but over different time periods. A typical example of temporary differences is depreciations 
which are usually more accelerated for tax purposes. (U.S. Department of the Treasury 1999) 
Another example of temporary differences is valuation allowance. It is important to note that 
valuation allowance results in an additional difference between taxable income and after-tax 
book income, whereas other temporary differences widen the gap between taxable income and 
pre-tax book income (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Uncertain tax contingency works roughly 
the same way as valuation allowance, thus resulting in an additional difference between taxable 
income and after-tax book income. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) point out that valuation 
allowance and uncertain tax contingency reserves are not tax strategies for companies. For 
instance, if a company has deferred tax assets (DTA) on the balance sheet from loss 
carryforwards, and the company notices that the probability of full realization of the tax benefits 
is very low in the foreseeable future, the company must adjust the DTA and thus lower its after-
tax book income.  
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The total amount of temporary differences can be seen in the balance sheet as the net of deferred 
tax assets (DTA) and deferred tax liabilities (DTL). Poterba et al. (2011) find that more 
companies have net DTLs than they have net DTAs.  
Permanent differences occur when income or expense is recognized only under one system and 
never under the other. Interests on municipal bonds, for instance, generate permanent difference 
since they are recognized only under financial accounting rules. (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury 1999) Permanent differences cause effective tax rates to differ from the statutory tax 
rates. However, permanent book-tax differences are not the only source that affect the 
reconciliation of the ETRs and the statutory rates. (Graham et al. 2012) Raedy et al. (2011) find 
that the largest reconciling items are foreign and state tax rates. It is notable that such differences 
are not caused by the difference of GAAP and tax rules (Graham et al. 2012).  
The reporting of U.S. taxes of foreign profits creates yet additional differences in book and tax 
reporting. The U.S. law allows taxes on the income of foreign subsidiaries to be deferred until 
repatriated to the parent as dividends. The income can though avoid current U.S. taxes, perhaps 
indefinitely. The law allows managers to choose between temporary and permanent treatment 
if the U.S. tax rate exceeds the local rate for the subsidiary. If a firm chooses the temporary 
treatment, it estimates the U.S. tax that will be required at repatriation and accrues that income 
tax expense. If the permanent treatment is chosen, the firm does not defer any expense until it 
decides to repatriate the funds. (Graham et al. 2012) 
Finally, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) also mention tax credits, which reduce the taxes owed, 
but do not affect taxable or pre-tax book income, and consolidation rules for book and tax 
purposes of which differ, resulting in different entities being consolidated for the group book 
and group tax reports. These items, however, are not relevant in the scope of this thesis.  
Aggressive reporting 
Many seem to believe that aggressive reporting for book or tax purposes may additionally widen 
the gap between book and tax income yet the argument is hard to verify. Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010) define aggressive tax reporting as a situation in which a manager has the choice to either 
report a revenue raise only for financial accounting purposes or for both tax and financial 
accounting purposes and he chooses to report it only for financial accounting purposes. The 
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term is close to the legal vagueness situation described by Palsternak and Rico (2008). They 
argue that sometimes taxpayers have the ability to manipulate legal terms. The chance arises 
when one legal term overlaps with another or there is a partial synonymy, and the activity is 
covered by the two terms at once, then the taxpayers have the legitimacy to use the term that 
reduces their tax burden. However, it is difficult to find evidence of such an activity (Hanlon 
and Heitzman 2010). 
Some evidence of nonconforming tax avoidance activities 
U.S. Department of the Treasury (1999) has defined tax shelters as arrangements or transactions 
that generate tax losses without incurring economic losses. The definition seems to be closely 
related to the definition for nonconforming tax avoidance, which was earlier discussed in this 
thesis. However, even that no universal definition for a tax shelter exists, the term is widely 
regarded as a form of a more aggressive tax avoidance practices. Wilson (2009) documents 
evidence that large book-tax differences signal tax sheltering, and that tax sheltering is 
associated with firm size. Lisowsky (2010) finds a positive relationship between tax shelters 
and subsidiaries located in tax havens, foreign-source income, inconsistent book-tax treatment, 
litigation losses, use of promoters, profitability, and size.  
Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) study income shifting to tax havens. They identify two major 
ways of multinationals to shift income to low-tax countries: financing structure and transfer 
pricing. Financing structure means in its most simple form multinationals’ tendency to finance 
affiliates in high-tax countries by debt. Transfer pricing, on the other hand, is about mispricing 
intra-firm international trade by overpricing (underpricing) of goods and services sold to 
affiliates in high-tax (low-tax) countries. (Bartelsman and Beetsma 2003) 
2.2.2 Conforming tax avoidance 
Above described tax avoidance activities that create differences in book and tax income are also 
called as nonconforming tax avoidance. In addition to that, conforming tax avoidance also 
occurs.  
Conforming tax avoidance means that financial accounting income is reduced when a tax 
strategy is employed. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) call for better measures to capture 
 13 
 
conforming tax avoidance, and Badertscher et al. (2016) are the first to address it, at least to my 
knowledge. They develop a new measure of conforming tax avoidance which is based on the 
ratio of cash taxes paid to lagged total assets, and they regress the ratio to extract the effect of 
nonconforming tax avoidance. They find evidence that capital market pressure influences public 
firms’ engagement in conforming tax avoidance. Conforming tax avoidance of public firms is 
especially interesting as it tells in which direction the tradeoff - reduced income tax liabilities 
or lower reported financial income - leans. Conforming tax avoidance may refer, for instance, 
to sale of fixed assets. (Badertscher et al. 2016)  
If the calculation of book and taxable income were similar, nonconforming tax avoidance would 
not exist, but all tax avoidance would be conforming. Hanlon et al. (2005) study what would 
happen if the two measures of income were conformed to one measure. They report that the 
information loss would be as high as 50 percent if the book income was conformed to the tax 
rules. 
2.2.3 Summary of the practices of tax avoidance 
The following Figure 2 summarizes the chapter 2.2. The mind map is based on the above 
discussion, and more specifically, merely on the studies of Graham et al. (2012), and Hanlon 
and Heitzman (2010). However, all the studies mentioned in the chapter 2.2 may have had some 
impact on the final version of the figure, but the extent of each study’s impact is difficult to 
specify. The aim of the figure is not only to summarize the chapter but also to give the reader a 
tool which can be used in the empirical part’s chapters. The terms presented in this chapter, such 
as “permanent differences” and “conforming tax avoidance”, will be mentioned quite often later 
on this thesis, and that is where the mind map can be helpful.  
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FIGURE 2. Different types of tax avoidance 
 
2.3 Determinants of tax avoidance 
This subchapter provides a review of the determinants of tax avoidance. First, I give an overview 
of basic, traditional determinants of tax avoidance. Then, agency framework is more closely 
examined because prior research suggests that agency frictions could be one single wider 
concept to explain corporate tax avoidance behavior. Lastly, as ownership patterns can strongly 
affect corporate tax avoidance, the topic and its related studies are inspected. Specific emphasis 
is put on the studies that relate to institutional ownership. 
 
TAX AVOIDANCE 
NON-CONFORMING 
AGGRESSIVE 
REPORTING 
Interests on 
municipal bonds 
Permanently 
reinvested foreign 
earnings 
… 
Depreciations 
Temporally 
reinvested 
foreign earnings 
… 
(= DTA – DTL) 
Sale of fixed assets 
TAX SHELTERS ETC. 
TEMPORARY PERMANENT 
CONFORMING 
Developed based mainly on Graham et al. (2012) 
and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) 
 15 
 
2.3.1 Overview of basic determinants 
An individual’s tax avoidance is affected by both external (e.g. probability of detection and 
punishment) and internal (e.g. tax morality, civic duty) motivation (Frey 1997). Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) and Luttmer and Singhal (2014) argue that many of the determinants of 
individual tax compliance apply to the corporate taxpayer as well. For instance, Hasan et al. 
(2016) document evidence that firms with higher civic norms are less likely to engage in tax 
avoidance activities, which could be comparable to an individual’s tax morality case. 
Prior research has find that corporate tax avoidance is associated with certain firm-level 
characteristics including profitability, scale of international operations, intangible assets, 
research and development expenditures, leverage, financial reporting aggressiveness, and equity 
risk incentives (e.g. Gupta and Newberry 1997; Rego 2003; Graham and Tucker 2006, Frank et 
al. 2009; Wilson 2009; Rego and Wilson 2012). Also, prior research suggests that top executives 
have a significant impact on their firms’ tax avoidance (Dyreng et al. 2010).  
The theoretical evidence for the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value is mixed. 
The traditional view suggests that firm value increases with tax avoidance, transferring wealth 
from the government to shareholders (Khurana and Moser 2013). Rego (2003) finds negative 
relationship between pre-tax income and effective tax rate (ETR). Consistently, Frank et al. 
(2009) find a strong relation between aggressive tax and financial reporting. However, Hanlon 
(2005) argues that investors view large positive book-tax differences as an indicator of low-
quality of earnings. Desai and Dharmapala (2009) do not find an average association between 
tax avoidance and firm value. 
2.3.2 Agency framework 
Dyreng et al. (2010) note that evidence on the determinants of tax avoidance remains still limited 
despite widespread interest in the area, and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggest that agency 
frictions could be an explanation. 
The agency problem - managers appointed by shareholders pursuing their own interests – in the 
tax avoidance context suggests that the link between corporate governance and taxation should 
be more widely understood. In contrast to the traditional view, the agency view sees tax 
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avoidance as not a simple transfer of profits from the government to shareholders; rather, 
managers may capture a share of the benefits of tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala 2008). 
Two competing agency theories try to explain why companies do not engage in tax avoidance 
in an optimal level – giving also some insight into the ambiguous relationship between tax 
avoidance and firm value.  
The first view is suggested by Desai and Dharmapala (2006). They argue that tax avoidance 
may create a shield for managerial opportunism. Complex tax avoidance strategies facilitate 
transactions with related parties, making it possible for managers to divert rents from the 
shareholders. The corporate structure becomes so opaque that it is impossible for shareholders 
to evaluate managers’ performance. Desai and Dharmapala further assume that incentive 
alignment may have two ambiguous effect on the extent to which managers undertake tax 
avoidance activities: (1) managers have better motivation to increase after-tax firm value, 
meaning increased tax avoidance, but (2) the incentives may dissuade managers from acts of 
opportunism, meaning decreased tax avoidance. Hence, the theory suggests the first effect to 
work for better-governed firms, and the latter to work for poorly-governed firms. Consistent 
with this view, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) find that the impact of tax avoidance on firm value 
is significantly stronger at better-governed firms. Also, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) study 
market reactions to news about tax sheltering activities by firms. They find overall a small 
negative reaction to news, but a more positive reaction for better-governed firms.  
The second and competing view is suggested by Armstrong et al. (2015). They argue that tax 
avoidance is one of many risky investment opportunities available to managers, and agency 
problems can lead managers to select a level of tax avoidance that is not optimal for 
shareholders. More knowledgeable boards understand the net benefits of tax avoidance, and 
encourage more tax planning at lower levels of tax avoidance, leading to an improved cash flow 
with little accompanying risk. Conversely, when the level of tax planning is high, more 
knowledgeable boards discourage additional tax avoidance, because the costs (e.g. regulatory 
or reputational) are likely to outweight the benefits. In other words, Armstrong et al. suggest 
that tax avoidance and managerial rent extraction are not complementary activities, questioning 
the theory of Desai and Dharmapala (2006). 
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Overall, the results concerning the relationships among corporate governance, incentive 
alignment, and tax avoidance are mixed. For instance, Rego and Wilson (2012) find that equity 
risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. However, they fail 
to find evidence of a relationship between other governance mechanisms and tax avoidance.  
2.3.3 Ownership patterns 
Ownership structure is an important factor that can affect corporate tax avoidance (Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010). The earliest research on the subject compared the impact of private ownership 
to public ownership (e.g. Beatty and Harris 1998; Mikhail 1999; Mills and Newberry 2001). 
The results were mixed. Mills and Newberry (2001) find that public firms report larger book-
tax differences compared to private firms. They explain the difference by the private firms’ 
fewer incentives to report nonconforming book income. Mikhail (1999) has a contradictory 
view; he finds that public companies do not seem to manage taxes, whereas private companies 
are aggressive in the field of tax planning. His explanation is based on the agency theory, 
indicating that incentive compensation contracts in the public companies reduce tax avoidance.  
The mixed results regarding the impact of private versus public ownership on corporate tax 
avoidance indicate that more detailed research is needed. This was also the concern of 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) who both called for more 
research on the subject to better understand the organizational factors that affect corporate tax 
avoidance. 
The research picked up in the 2010s. Chen et al. (2010) compare family firms and their non-
family counterparts in relation to tax aggressiveness. The research composition is interesting 
because both the costs (share price discount from non-family shareholders, penalties from tax 
authorities, damage on family reputation) and benefits (family owners have higher holdings and 
thus benefit more from tax savings or concealed rent extraction) of tax avoidance appear to be 
greater for family firms compared to their counterparts. The results show that family firms 
exhibit lower tax aggressiveness than their counterparts, highlighting the importance of nontax 
costs. However, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) critique the result interpretation of Chen et al. 
(2010), arguing that the research does not take into account the possibility of conforming tax 
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avoidance by family firms.  Also, Armstrong et al. (2015) express their concern by questioning 
the interpretation of low levels of tax avoidance as a symptom of good governance. 
Cheng et al. (2012) find that businesses targeted by head fund activists exhibit higher level of 
tax avoidance after a hedge fund intervention. Interestingly, the research shows that tax 
avoidance in the target firms is associated with the hedge funds’ past success in implementing 
tax changes, explaining the increase in the tax avoidance level at least partly. This is consistent 
with the classic agency theory, which predicts that managers must have incentives to pursue all 
opportunities to maximize firm value, and if a manager is not maximizing value, the investors 
can attempt to change specific policies (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Badertscher et al. (2013) consider the influence of management ownership relative to private 
equity ownership in private firms on tax avoidance. Their findings indicate that greater 
concentration of ownership and control leads to less tax avoidance because owner-managers are 
risk-averse and private equity ownership have lower marginal cost of tax avoidance. 
McGuire et al. (2014) study the specific situation of dual-class stocks. They find that such firms 
engage in less tax avoidance activities, reflecting two probable explanations: (1) tax avoidance 
is costly to managers and in the case of dual-class stocks, shareholders have limited ability to 
compel managers to such an activity, and (2) as the gap between voting rights and cash flow 
rights is wide, shareholder anticipation of the rent extraction will lead easily to a share price 
discount, making managers more careful to take part in tax avoidance. 
Institutional ownership and corporate tax avoidance 
Recently, three studies have examined the impact of institutional ownership on corporate tax 
practices (Chen et al. 2015; Khan et al. 2016; Bird and Karolyi 2017), and they all find a 
significant positive relationship between institutional investors and corporate tax avoidance for 
all tax avoidance measures they test. Khan et al. (2016) and Bird and Karolyi (2017) report also 
a significant use of tax shelters. However, Chen et al. (2015) do not find any difference in the 
use of tax shelters. Additionally, Khan et al. (2016) document benefits in the form of higher net 
income margins and likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. Results concerning the 
effect of corporate governance are mixed. Chen et al. (2015) do not find relation between 
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corporate governance and tax avoidance, whereas Bird and Karolyi (2017) find some evidence 
of such a relation.  
These results are partly contradictory to the studies of Khurana and Moser (2013) and Hasan et 
al. (2016) who find an overall negative relation between institutional investors and corporate 
tax avoidance. Both studies highlight the importance of long-term investment horizon and 
corporate governance quality as the drivers of the results. The results of Khurana and Moser are 
especially strong for firms with poor government. Khan et al. (2016) critique the study of 
Khurana and Moser arguing that they (1) fail to control endogeneity of institutional ownership 
and (2) they do not use powerful enough tests in capturing the relationship between institutional 
shareholders and corporate tax avoidance. 
The following Table 1 summarizes some of the most important prior research papers that are 
related to tax avoidance. The research papers on the list have all been referenced earlier in this 
thesis but in different chapters. 
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TABLE 1. Overview of prior tax avoidance related research 
Authors Data Tax avoidance 
measures* 
Key findings 
Armstrong, 
Blouin, 
Jagolinzer and 
Larcker (2015) 
Compustat data; 
4,128 observations; 
2007-2011 
UTB, GAAP_ETR3  Risk-taking incentives positively 
related to tax avoidance. Better-
governed firms exhibit a positive 
relation with tax avoidance in the 
left tail of the tax avoidance 
distribution 
        
Badertscher, 
Katz and Rego 
(2013) 
2,970 observations; 
1980-2010 
GAAP_ETR3 and 
CASH_ETR3, DTAX 
(Frank et al. 2009), 
SHELTER  
Less concentrated ownership and 
control related to greater tax 
avoidance 
        
Bird and 
Karolyi (2017) 
Compustat, CRSP 
and Spectrum 13F 
data; 15,214 
observations; 1996-
2006 
CASH_ETR, 
GAAP_ETR, BTD 
(Rego and Wilson 
2012), SHELTER, 
TaxHaven_dum 
Firms with institutional shareholders 
engage more in tax avoidance: lower 
CASH_ETR and GAAP_ETR, 
lower BTD, more sheltering. The 
effect is greater for firms with poor 
governance 
        
Chen, Chen, 
Cheng and 
Shevlin (2010) 
Compustat, 
ExecuComp and 
IRRC data; 3,865 
observations; 1996-
2000 
CASH_ETR, 
GAAP_ETR, BTDs 
(Manzon&Plesko 2002; 
Desai and Dharmapala 
2006) 
Family firms engage less in tax 
avoidance than their counterparts 
        
Chen, Li and 
Shevlin (2015) 
Russel, Compustat 
and Thomson data; 
1996-2006 
GAAP_ETR, 
CASH_ETR, BTD, 
SHELTER 
Firms with quasi-indexer (passive) 
institutional owners engage more in 
tax avoidance: lower CASH_ETR 
and GAAP_ETR, lower BTD, no 
difference in sheltering. Results 
unaffected by governance. 
        
Cheng, Huang, 
Li and 
Stanfield 
(2012) 
Compustat, 
Thomson 13F and 
EDGAR 13D data; 
2,981 observations; 
1994-2008 
GAAP ETR, 
CASH_ETR, BTD 
(Manzon&Plesko 2002) 
Hedge funds' target firms exhibit 
higher level of tax avoidance 
following the funds' intervention 
        
Desai and 
Dharmapala 
(2006) 
Compustat and 
Execucomp data; 
>900 firms; 1993-
2001 
BTD (Manzon&Plesko 
2002), SHELTER 
High-powered incentives relate to 
low-level of tax avoidance, but the 
relation holds only with weaker 
corporate governance 
        
Dyreng, 
Hanlon and 
Maydew 
(2008) 
Compustat data; 
2,077 firms; 1995-
2004 
CASH_ETR1, 
CASH_ETR5, 
CASH_ETR10 
Firms can have low CASH_ETR for 
as long as 10 years; 1 year 
CASH_ETR not suggestive of long-
run tax avoidance 
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Dyreng, 
Hanlon and 
Maydew 
(2010) 
EcecuComp and 
Compustat data; 
12,958 observations; 
1992-2006 
CASH_ETR, 
GAAP_ETR 
Top executives have a significant 
impact on their firms' tax avoidance 
        
Khan, 
Srinivasan and 
Than (2016) 
Russel, Compustat 
and Thomson data; 
1988-2006 
CASH_ETR, 
GAAP_ETR, BTDs 
(Manzon&Plesko 2002; 
Desai and Dharmapala 
2006), SHELTER 
Firms with institutional shareholders 
engage more in tax avoidance: lower 
CASH_ETR and GAAP_ETR, 
lower BTD, more sheltering 
        
Khurana and 
Moser (2013) 
Compustat and 
Thomson 13F data; 
17,997 observations; 
1996-2008 
BTD (Rego and Wilson 
2012), PERM_BTD 
(Frank et al. 2009), 
CASH_ETR, 
SHELTER 
Firms with long-term institutional 
shareholders engage less in tax 
avoidance: higher CASH_ETR and 
GAAP_ETR, lower BTD, less 
sheltering. Effect of governance. 
        
Lisowsky 
(2010) 
Compustat and 
OTSA data; 9,223 
observations 
SHELTER Tax shelters related to subsidiaries 
in tax havens, foreign source 
income, inconsistent book-tax 
treatment, litigation losses, use of 
external service providers, 
profitability, and size 
        
McGuire, 
Wang and 
Wilson (2014) 
Compustat data; 
27,591 observations; 
1995-2002 
CASH_ETR, 
GAAP_ETR 
Tax avoidance costly to managers; 
managers careful due to possible 
share price discount; dual-class 
firms engage less in tax planning 
        
Rego and 
Wilson (2012) 
EcecuComp and 
Compustat data; 
18,240 observations; 
2007-2009 
CASH_ETR5, DTAX, 
SHELTER, UTB 
Equity risk incentives are a 
significant determinant of corporate 
tax avoidance 
        
Wilson (2009) 59 firms; 1975-2007 BTD (permanent, 
temporary, adjusted), 
SHELTER 
Large book-tax differences signal 
tax sheltering; tax sheltering 
associated with firm size; tax 
shelters with strong corporate 
governance associated with 
abnormal returns 
        
* Tax avoidance measures:     
BTD = book-tax difference     
CASH ETR = cash effective tax rate, numbers refer to if the measure is calculated over several years 
DTAX = discretionary permanent book-tax difference   
GAAP ETR =GAAP effective tax rate, numbers refer to if the measure is calculated over several years 
SHELTER = measure of the use of tax shelters (Wilson 2009)   
UTB = firm's uncertain tax benefit     
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3 INSTITUTION AS AN OWNER 
In the chapter three, previous research about institutional ownership is introduced. The chapter 
does not focus on tax avoidance studies, as they were introduced in the prior chapter, but it 
examines some important, general research papers about institutional investors. That way the 
reader’s understanding about institution as an investor and owner increases. For instance, if we 
know the ways by which the institutions affect their target firms, the same ways may be accurate 
when it comes to affecting tax avoidance of the firms. The ultimate target of this chapter is to 
provide better understanding on how institutional owners may impact their target firms’ tax 
avoidance. 
3.1 Institutional vs. individual owner 
In this thesis, shareholders, investors and owners refer to the same – to those entities that own 
shares of the companies. Moreover, from the mass of investors, institutions are separated into 
closer inspection. Whereas individual is a physical person, institution is an organization that 
invests on behalf of its members. In order to understand the research choice of the thesis – the 
choice to focus on institutions as a group investors – and what the choice means, institutional 
investor characters are compared to those of individuals. 
The percentage of public equity held by physical persons has declined over the years. In the 
mid-1960s, physical persons hold 84% of all publicly listed stock in the U.S. In 2011, the 
corresponding percentage was 40% (Çelik and Isaksson 2013). Of all stocks in S&P500, 
institutional investors own now around 80% (Elhauge 2016). 
Prior research has recognized several ways by which institutions differ from individuals as 
investors. First, institutions are widely acknowledged to be better at monitoring and gathering 
information than individuals. Monitoring can mean gathering information, analyzing 
information, acting based on the information, or influencing others – either managers of other 
shareholders (Fich et al. 2015). Institutions invest larger amounts in each stock and, therefore, 
they have incentives to devote resources to monitoring (Grossman and Hart 1980). Second, taxes 
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and regulations distinguish institutional investors from individuals. Some institutions, like 
pension funds, do not pay taxes on their capital gains or dividends. Third, institutions are 
fiduciaries – they invest on behalf of others and, therefore, are subject to agency conflicts. 
Some prior research articles have stated that institutional investors prefer short-term earnings 
over long-term earnings, called also as myopic behavior (Porter 1992, Lang and McNichols 
1997). Two characteristics of the U.S. markets are often blamed for this: U.S. accounting 
standards which require immediate expensing of some long-term investment costs (e.g. R&D 
expenditure), and short-term performance pressure combined with the fiduciary role of 
institutional investors (Bushee 2001). 
To institutions, selling and buying processes are very similar. Institutions routinely sell short, 
and they thus have identical sets of purchases and sales. Institutional investors also devote time 
to searching when they buy and sell, and they use computers to narrow the search. As for 
individuals, selling and buying processes differ: most individuals do not sell short, and they less 
often devote much time for searching when they buy or sell. When it comes to selling of the 
shares, rational investors sell their past losers. However, not all individuals are rationale sellers 
– behavioral investors sell their past winners as to postpone the regret of realizing the losses. 
(Barber and Odean 2008) 
3.2 Active and passive institutional investors 
Sometimes institutions are suspected to be bad owners. The reason for the fear may be related 
to the above discussed fiduciary role of institutional investors or the possible myopic behavior 
of the institutional shareholders. However, when such a concern arises in the public discussion, 
passive institutional investors are more often blamed for it. That is why I will briefly discuss 
about the difference between passive and active investors with the help of few important 
research papers. 
Recent research often divides institutional investors into active and passive investors. Active 
investors refer to activists that accumulate shares or active fund managers that sell shares in a 
target company with the purpose of influencing management. Many institutions are instead 
passive - their objective could be to deliver the returns of a market index. Such passive investors 
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do not actively buy or sell shares. (Appel et al. 2016) The basic assumption behind a passive 
investment strategy is that the market returns are positive given enough time. Passive investors 
are characterized by holding diversified portfolios with low turnover and long investment 
horizon. (Bushee and Noe 2000) 
Multitude of evidence suggests that active institutional investors create value for shareholders 
by effectively influencing the governance, capital structure decisions, and operating 
performance of target firms (e.g. Brav et al. 2008). Instead, passive institutional investors are 
suspected to weaken the governance and performance of firms. 
However, the main finding of this emerging literature proves that passive investors are active 
owners: they improve various aspects of corporate governance and enhance firm transparency 
(Appel et al. 2016; Crane et al. 2016; Boone and White 2015). Passive institutions pressure 
portfolio firms by monitoring managers and improving market performance - because they do 
not have the power to exit - and these activities increase the value of their assets under 
management (Appel et al. 2016). When it comes to influencing others, passive institutional 
investors use their sizable voting blocks to wield influence (Appel et al. 2016; Crane et al. 2016), 
and they are also effective in a widespread and low-cost monitoring of firms (Black 1998; Appel 
et al. 2016). 
To summarize, institutional investors are better at monitoring than individuals, they may value 
short-term over long-term, they generally act more rationally than individuals when they buy 
and sell shares, and both active and passive investors increase the value of their target 
companies. However, we cannot homogenize institutional investors - in contrast, they are very 
much a heterogeneous group of investors (e.g. Bushee 1998).  
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4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Chapter four introduces the hypothesis which are based on the concepts and theories described 
in the chapters two and three. 
While the number of studies investigating the relationship between institutional investors and 
corporate tax avoidance keeps increasing, the results still show some contradictory evidence. 
This study tries to add value on three aspects of the young field: (1) the overall effect of 
institutional investors on corporate tax avoidance, (2) institutional investors and corporate 
conforming tax avoidance (3) the relationship between the number of institutional owners and 
corporate tax avoidance. 
4.1 Nonconforming tax avoidance 
The first issue, corporate nonconforming tax avoidane, is discussed by all research papers that 
study the the relationship of institutional investors and corporate tax avoidance. While Bird and 
Karolyi (2017), Chen et al. (2015) and Khan et al. (2016) find evidence of a positive relationship, 
Khurana and Moser (2013) and Hasan et al. (2016) argue for negative relation. The positive 
relation is reasoned to come from governmental activities (Bird and Karolyi 2017; Chen et al. 
2015), better international tax planning (Bird and Karolyi 2017), better state and federal tax 
planning (Chen et al. 2015), incentive alignment (Desai and Dharmapala 2006, 2009; Armstrong 
et al. 2015), and aggressive tax sheltering (Bird and Karolyi 2017; Khan et al. 2016). 
Summarized, the studies state that institutional investors bring companies abilities to monitor 
managers, and also tax planning knowledge which both improve tax planning of the company. 
Monitoring managers makes the managers work more effectively and thus enforces effective 
tax planning. This reasoning is consistent with the general research on the role of institutional 
investors: institutions are good at monitoring and gathering information.   
Khurana and Moser (2013) and Hasan et al. (2016) highlight the importance of long-term 
investment horizon, and they argue that reputational effect plays an important role. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006, 2009) and Armstrong et al. (2015) both argue that if the initial level of 
corporate tax avoidance is very high, investors want to decrease it either because they want to 
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lower the level of possible managerial rent extraction (Desai and Dharmapala) or because they 
want to lower high risks associated with high tax avoidance (Armstrong et al.). 
All of the above mentioned research papers have used only nonconforming tax avoidance 
measures to test the relationship between institutional investors and corporate tax avoidance. 
Thus, the following hypotheses of mine refer only to nonconforming tax avoidance.  
H1a: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit higher levels of nonconforming tax 
avoidance. 
H1b: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit lower levels of nonconforming tax 
avoidance. 
4.2 Conforming tax avoidance 
Badestscher et al. (2013) aknowledge that private firms are less subject to financial reporting 
pressures than public firms, which means that they may engage in more conforming tax 
avoidance than public firms. I do not intend to distinguish between private and public firms in 
my research sample and though I only want to test if there is any associaton between institutional 
owners and corporate conforming tax avoidance. Since no prior research exist, I set two 
hypotheses as follows. 
H2a: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit higher levels of conforming tax avoidance. 
H2b: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit lower levels of conforming tax avoidance. 
4.3 Number of institutional owners 
Fich et al. (2015) argue that total institutional ownership may be a noisy measure of the 
underlying variable of interest, and that the measure may be behind some contradictory results 
in the prior literature. Edmans and Manso (2011) suggest that in addition to total institutional 
ownership, the number of institutional blockholders is another important factor and may be 
relevant for future empirical work. In fact, many firms have multiple small blockholders (Faccio 
and Lang 2002; Maury and Pajuste 2005), which leads to a free-rider problem: each investor 
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individually has insufficient incentives to bear the cost of monitoring (Grossman and Hart 
1980).  
Based on above, I hypothyse that firms with multiple blockholders may be less efficient at tax 
planning because of the free-rider problem. In other words, firms with multiple blockholders 
engage in less tax avoidance than firms with fewer blockholders. 
H3: Firms with multiple institutional shareholders exhibit lower levels of tax avoidance. 
  
 28 
 
5 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this section I will briefly describe the data collection procedure, and exhaustively present the 
empirical models used. 
5.1 Sample selection 
First of all, I select all firm-year observations in Compustat for fiscal years 2011 through 2015, 
which amounts to total 46,368 observations. Secondly, I use Thomson Reuters database to get 
institutional ownership data for the same period 2011-2015. I use SPSS to both process and 
analyze the data. 
Institutional ownership information is reported by institutional investor managers quarterly. 
Managers are required to file the SEC Form 13F filing if they have $100 million or more 
ownership in Section 13f securities. Section 13f securities refer to equity securities; they include, 
for example, U.S. exchange-traded stocks (e.g. NYSE, NASDAQ). A list of Section 13f 
securities is available always shortly after the end of each quarter on the SEC’s website. An 
institutional investment manager is an entity that invests in, buys or sells securities for its own 
account. An institutional investment manager is also a person or an entity that exercises 
investment discretion over the account of any other person or entity. A person who buys and 
sells securities for his own account is not an institutional investment manager. (SEC 2017) 
Thomson Reuters provides institutional ownership data by each investor quarterly. For instance, 
if the firm has over 1,500 different institutional owners, the firm is represented in the data over 
6,000 times (4 quarters * 1,500 investors) in one year, meaning over 6,000 rows in SPSS in one 
year. Before making a reconciliation with the Compustat data, the Thomson Reuters data needs 
further processing so that I have the average shares owned by institutional investors in each firm 
in each year, and the number of different institutional owners in each firm in each year. After 
that I make a reconciliation between the Compustat and Thomson Reuters data sets, so that each 
Compustat observation now has institutional ownership information if available.  
I delete all Compustat observations with missing values for institutional ownership. In this case, 
missing values mean either that the firm is not in any of the filed 13f forms, or that the firm was 
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not owned by any institution in the observation year. However, deleting the missing values is a 
safe procedure and common in prior research (see e.g. Khurana and Moser 2013). The sample 
size is now reduced to 26,767 observations. 
After deleting observations with missing values for institutional ownership information, I delete 
all observations with missing values for total assets. Also, I follow prior research (see e.g. 
Khurana and Moser 2013, Badertscher et al. 2016) and eliminate all financial institutions (SIC 
codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). Those firms are subject to a different set 
of tax and accounting rules (Hanlon et al. 2005). With these eliminations, the sample now 
consists of 16,542 observations. 
Next I delete observations which have insufficient data to calculate my tax avoidance measures, 
and all observations with insufficient data to calculate my control variables. Few control 
variables, specifically indicator variables for loss carry forwards and income in foreign 
operations, are set to zero for the missing values. This yields a final sample of between 8,624 
and 6,686 firm-year observations depending on the measure of tax avoidance. 
Table 2 summarizes the sample selection process.  
TABLE 2. Data processing 
Firm-year observations in Compustat between 2011-2015  46,368 
  Less observations with missing values for institutional ownership -19,601 
Subtotal 26,767 
  Less missing values for total assets -3,874 
  
Less financial service firms and regulated public utilities (SIC code 6000-6999 & 
4900-4999) 
-6,351 
Subtotal 16,542 
  
Less observations with insufficient data to calculate measures of tax avoidance 
(CASH ETR, GAAP ETR) 
-6,392 
Subtotal 10,150 
  Less observations with missing data to calculate control variables -1,526 
Total observations for CASH ETR and GAAP ETR regression estimations 8,624 
  Less obervations with missing values to calculate CONFORM_TAX and BTD -1,938 
Total observations for CONFORMING_TAX and BTD regression estimations 6,686 
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5.2 Empirical model 
To test my hypotheses, I estimate the following regression equation using ordinary least squares 
(OLS): 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗+1𝐶𝑖𝑡,                                                       (1) 
where: 
TAX = a proxy for tax avoidance 
InstOwnership  = a set of test variables 
C = a set of control variables 
Subscripts i and t refer to company and year, respectively. 
5.2.1 Dependent variables 
Following prior literature, I employ multiple tax avoidance measures. This allows me to 
examine the robustness of the results. As my main measures of nonconforming tax avoidance 
behavior, I use two effective tax rates, GAAP_ETR and CASH_ETR. I follow Dyreng et al. 
(2010) in measuring GAAP_ETR as total tax expense divided by pretax income and CASH_ETR 
as cash taxes paid divided by pretax income. As the rates are not meaningful for firms with 
negative pretax income, all observations with negative pretax income are excluded from 
analysis; firms that have negative pretax income have only a weak incentive to engage in tax 
avoidance activity as they may never be able to benefit from it. Also, all observations with pre-
tax income equal to zero are excluded as denominators cannot be zero. Hence, my analysis focus 
on firms with positive pretax income and thus positive estimated taxable income for the most of 
the firms. After calculating the rates, I winsorize the resulting values to 0 and 1, which is 
consistent with Dyreng et al. (2010). 
These effective tax rate measures capture the average rate of tax per dollar of income. As 
mentioned, one of the downsizes of the measures is that analysis can focus only on firms with 
positive pretax income. However, the measures are widely used as they are easily observable 
and salient measures of tax avoidance activities (Bird and Karolyi 2017). The GAAP_ETR 
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affects accounting earnings. It does not reflect tax deferral strategies, but it could be affected by 
several items that are not tax planning strategies, such as changes in the valuation allowance.  
The GAAP_ETR reflects permanent book-tax differences. (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) 
The CASH_ETR, on the other hand, is affected by tax deferral strategies, but it is not affected 
by changes in tax accounting accruals. The CASH_ETR reflects both permanent and temporary 
book-tax differences. Both measures capture only nonconforming tax avoidance strategies. 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). 
My third measure of nonconforming tax avoidance is a book-tax difference, BTD, measured as 
the difference between pretax income and estimated taxable income (e.g. Mills 1998, Desai 
2003, Badertscher et al. 2016). Following closely prior literature, I calculate the estimated 
taxable income by summing current federal tax expense and current foreign tax expense, 
dividing it by the statutory tax rate, and then subtracting the change in loss carryforwards in the 
beginning of the year. The statutory tax rate is the top U.S. statutory tax rate applicable to that 
data year, being 35 percent for the all my data years (OECD Statistics). The BTD captures both 
permanent and temporary book-tax differences. Also like ETRs, BTD proxies have several 
limitations. Small values in the denominators induce skewness, different rules for calculations 
of the book and tax incomes can distort book-tax difference proxies based on estimated taxable 
income, and finally, using the U.S. statutory tax rate of 35 percent often underestimates foreign 
taxable income as most countries have lower top statutory tax rate than the U.S. (Hanlon 2003). 
My fourth measure of tax avoidance behavior is CONFORMING_TAX, which is measured 
following Badertscher et al. (2016). The measure is one of the first measures in the literature 
that try to capture conforming tax avoidance. Prior to that, studies have focused mainly on 
capturing nonconforming tax avoidance as many generally accepted measures for it exist. Prior 
studies also assume that public firms are not that tempted to engage in conforming tax avoidance 
because of the public pressure to create high accounting earnings (Chen et al. 2010). However, 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) call for a new measure of conforming tax avoidance, so that studies 
could obtain a broader perspective on firm’s tax avoidance activities. This thesis tries to offer 
such a broad perspective by including the only recently created conforming tax avoidance 
measure of Badertscher et al. in addition to commonly used ETRs and BTD.  
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The CONFORMING TAX is obtained by regressing the following equation and extracting the 
residual as the proxy for CONFORMING_TAX: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐸𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐼𝐷_𝑇𝑂_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡          (2) 
+𝛽4𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5∆𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝑇𝑂_𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
where 
TAXESPAID_TO_ASSETS     = ratio of cash taxes paid to lagged total assets 
BTDit              = measure of book-tax-difference 
NEGit              = indicator set to 1 if the firm has negative BTD 
BTDit * NEGit              = interaction of BTD and NEG 
NOLit              = indicator set to 1 if the firm has loss carryforward available 
∆NOLit              = change in the loss carryforwards 
SALES_TO_NOAit              = ratio of net sales to net operating assets 
I regress the ratio of cash taxes paid to lagged total assets (TAXESPAID_TO_ASSETS) on six 
control variables and control also for year and industry fixed effects, consistently with 
Badertscher et al. (2016). Similarly to CASH_ETR, the numerator of the 
TAXESPAID_TO_ASSETS is reduced by deferral tax strategies, and it is not affected by tax 
accounting accruals. The denominator of the ratio is a lagged balance sheet measure, which is 
neither sensitive to current period transactions nor to a variation in pretax profitability. However, 
the problem with the ratio is that both conforming and nonconforming tax strategies reduce it. 
That is why it is regressed on control variables – the control variables are meant to eliminate the 
effect of the nonconforming tax avoidance. 
The equation takes into account both positive and negative book-tax differences (BTD) to 
remove the impact of nonconforming tax strategies: an indicator variable NEG is set to one for 
observations with negative book-tax differences, and BTD*NEG is the interaction of BTD and 
NEG. Other control variables include NOL and ∆NOL which control the level and changes of 
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net operating loss carryforwards because the utilization of loss carryforwards will reduce cash 
taxes paid, but it is not indicative of conforming tax avoidance. Additionally, the ratio of net 
sales to net operating assets SALES_TO_NOA controls for the impact of non-tax operating 
decisions. If the firm has more non-operational costs (e.g. advertisement) for strategic rather 
than tax reasons, then the firm should exhibit a different level of operating efficiency than other 
firms. (Badertscher et al. 2016) 
5.2.2 Test variables 
I include two test variables which relate to the role of institutional ownership. First one is a 
continuous variable, InstOwn, which is calculated as the average shares owned by institutional 
investors in year t divided by total shares at the end of year t. InstOwnNumber_dum is an 
indicator variable which is set to 1 if the firm’s stock is owned by less than 40 different 
institutions, and 0 otherwise.  
The boundary for the indicator variable, 40, is chosen because with the boundary of 50, the 
results start to become contradictory. I also test the regression with lower boundaries to see 
whether the results stay similar. The results start to become contradictory with a boundary of 10 
(specifically, the GAAP_ETR differs from the other nonconforming tax avoidance measures). 
However, the firms with less than 10 different institutional shareholders represent only 5-7 
percent of the whole sample, or 324-627 firm-year observations, depending on the tax avoidance 
measure, and the results are not significant. 
5.2.3 Control variables 
The selection of the independent variables follows the existing literature (e.g. Dyreng et al. 2010, 
Khurana and Moser 2013, Badertscher et al. 2013, Bird and Karolyi 2017). I control for the 
firm’s profitability (PI), leverage (LEV), loss carryforwards (NOL_dum), size (SIZE), sales 
change (∆SALES), cash holdings (CASH_HOLD), property, plant and equipment (PPE), 
intangible assets (INTANG), income from subsidiaries (EQINC_dum), foreign income 
(FORINC_dum), different type of expenditures - capital (CAPEX), advertisement (ADVEX), 
research and development (RDEX), and selling, general and administrative (SGAEX) - and year 
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and industry fixed effects. I divide the control variables into four groups for further inspection: 
(I) need for tax avoidance, (II) differences in financial and tax accounting treatment, (III) nontax 
expenditures, and (IV) year and industry fixed effects. 
(I) Need for tax avoidance (PI, LEV, NOL_dum, SIZE, ∆SALES, CASH_HOLD) 
My first set of variables controls for firms’ different incentives for tax avoidance activities. Prior 
literature suggests that more profitable firms avoid more taxes which is intuitively 
understandable: the benefit in absolute dollars from tax avoidance activities is greater the greater 
the profit of the firm. PI is calculated as pretax income scaled by lagged assets. 
Leverage, on the other hand, creates a tax shield: the more leveraged a firm, the less it needs to 
avoid taxes in other ways. The effect of tax deductibility of the interest was recognized first by 
Modigliani and Miller (1963). LEV is calculated as long-term debt scaled by lagged assets. 
Firms that have loss carryforwards have weaker incentives to engage in tax avoidance activities 
for two reasons (Badertscher et al. 2016). First, they may never be able to utilize the benefits 
gained. Second, even that they would start generating profits this year, they can deduct the losses 
from previous years which would not probably encourage tax avoidance activities before next 
year. NOL_dum is an indicator variable set 1 for the firms that have net operating loss 
carryforwards available at the beginning of year. 
A study of Dyreng et al. (2008) indicate that small firms are more likely to have higher effective 
tax rates. In other words, it seems that the bigger the firm, the greater the need for tax planning 
(through motivation or capability). Thus, it is important to control for size. SIZE is calculated as 
the natural logarithm of assets.  
Also, prior research suggests that high growth firms have more investments that generate 
increased book-tax differences. Chen et al. (2010) note that growing firms may invest in more 
tax-favored assets. ∆SALES is calculated as the annual percentage change in net sales. 
Finally, low cash holdings may lead to a greater need for tax avoidance. CASH_HOLD is 
calculated as cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets.  
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(II) Differences in financial and tax accounting treatment (PPE, INTANG, EQINC_dum, 
FORINC_dum) 
My second set of variables control for differences in financial and tax accounting treatment. 
Prior research suggests that firms with higher levels of either fixed or intangible assets have 
higher non-debt tax shields because they can have higher depreciation or amortization 
deductions for tax purposes than those for accounting purposes. PPE is calculated as net 
property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged assets. INTANG is calculated as intangible assets 
scaled by lagged assets. 
Income received from participations in group companies, related entities or other fixed assets is 
often treated differently for financial and tax accounting purposes (Chen et al. 2010; Frank et 
al. 2009). An indicator variable EQINC_dum is set to 1 if the firm has equity income in earnings.  
Lastly, foreign income is treated differently for financial and tax accounting purposes, as was 
also touched on previously in this thesis (see chapter 2.2.1). An indicator variable FORINC_dum 
is set to 1 if the firm has foreign income. 
(III) Nontax expenditures (CAPEX, ADVEX, RDEX, SGAEX) 
Whether to include or not the third set of control variables was a decision that needed the most 
consideration. For instance, if I included spending on advertisement as a control variable in my 
regression model, I would assume that the spending decision is a nontax decision. In other 
words, possible effect on tax rate is only a byproduct. If I did not include spending on 
advertisement as a control variable in the regression, then the assumption would be that spending 
on advertisement is intentional on the part of institutional investors in order to affect the tax rate. 
Since I do not know which are the ways of institutional investors to affect corporate tax 
planning, I have to arbitrarily choose between the two designs, similarly to previous research. I 
choose to include these variables and I interpret the results accordingly. Dyreng et al. (2010) 
and Bird and Karolyi (2017), among others, made the same choice, but Khurana and Moser 
(2013), for example, did not include these control variables.  
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CAPEX is calculated as capital expenditure divided by sales, ADVEX as advertisement 
expenditure divided by sales, RDEX as research and development expenditure divided by sales, 
and SGAEX as sales, general and administrative expenditure divided by sales.  
(IV) Year and industry fixed effects 
Every prior research paper controls for year and industry fixed effects, so I follow them and do 
the same. I create four dummy variables for years (2011-2014) and 12 dummy variables for 
industries based on Barth et al. (1998) industry groups.  
5.2.4 Variable summary 
Table 3 summarizes all variables used in the main regression estimations. More comprehensive 
variable summary with all Compustat data items is to be found in APPENDIX 1, panels A and 
B. 
TABLE 3. Variable definitions  
As each variable is described, Compustat pneumonic is in parantheses 
Dependent variables   
CASH_ETR = the cash effective tax rate, defined as cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided 
by pre-tax book income (PI). CASH_ETR is set to missing when the 
denominator is zero or negative. CASH_ETR is winsorized to the range 
[0, 1]. 
GAAP_ETR = the financial accounting effective tax rate, defined as total tax expense 
(TXT) divided by pre-tax income (PI). GAAP_ETR is set to missing 
when the denominator is zero or negative. GAAP_ETR is winsorized to 
the range [0, 1]. 
BTD = book-tax differences, defined as book income (PI) less taxable income 
[(TXFED+TXFO)/STR - ∆NOL] 
CONFORMING_TAX = the residual from equation TAXESPAID_TO_ASSETS 
    
Test variables   
InstOwn = The average percentage of the firm's stock owned by institutional 
shareholders in year t 
InstOwnNumber_dum = An indicator if the firm's stock is owned by less than 40 different 
institutions 
    
Control variables   
PI = pretax income (PI) scaled by lagged assets (ATt-1) 
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LEV = leverage; long-term debt scaled by lagged assets 
NOL_dum = an indicator if the firm has a non-zero, non-missing value for net 
operating loss carry forwards (TLCF) in the beginning of the year 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets (AT) 
∆SALES = 
sales (SALE) divided by sales of the previous year (SALEt-1) minus 
one. 
CASH_HOLD = cash and short-term investments (CHE) scaled by total assets (AT) 
PPE = 
net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) scaled by lagged assets 
(ATt-1) 
INTANG = intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by lagged assets (ATt-1) 
EQINC_dum = an indicator if the firm has equity income in earnings (ESUB) 
FORINC_dum = an indicator if the firm has a non-zero, non-missing value for pre-tax 
income from foreign operations (PIFO) 
CAPEX = Capital expenditure (CAPX) divided by net sales (SALE) 
ADVEX = Advertisement expenditure (XADV) divided by net sales (SALE) 
RDEX = Research and development expenditure (XRD) divided by net sales 
(SALE) 
SGAEX = Sales, general and administrative expenditure (XSGA) divided by net 
sales (SALE) 
    
Other variables   
YEAR = indicator variables for observation years 
INDUS = indicator variables for industry groups 
 
Furthermore, the following equation (3) summarizes the chapter three by showing the equation 
(1) in its extended form. As discussed above, I run the regression separately for each of the 
dependent variables CASH_ETR, GAAP_ETR, BTD and CONFORMING_TAX (denoted with 
TAX). 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗
𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝐿_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 ∗
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11 ∗ 𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽12 ∗ 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐶_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 ∗ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15 ∗ 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽16 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝐴𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          
  
(3) 
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6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The purpose of the section is to find out how institutional investors impact corporate tax 
avoidance. In other words, the section presents the results about how my empirical findings 
support my hypothesis. First, I provide some descriptive statistics concerning the dataset and 
correlations among the variables. Then, regression results are presented and analyzed in three 
sets: nonconforming tax avoidance, conforming tax avoidance and number of institutional 
shareholders. Finally, I go through the additional tests that I conducted in order to test the 
robustness of the results.  
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
This chapter presents descriptive statistics of variables.  I start by reporting the statistics for the 
dependent variables, then for the other variables. Finally, I compare my sample’s industry 
characteristics to those of the corresponding Compustat population. 
Table 4 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in my analysis including 
both dependent variables (CASH_ETR, GAAP_ETR, BTD, CONFORM_TAX) and test and 
control variables. I do not report the statistics of control and test variables for using the reduced 
sample of 6,686 observations – they are like those reported in Table 4 Panel A. 
The mean (median) value for the cash effective tax rate (CASH_ETR) is 25.5 percent (23.0 
percent), which is consistent with the distributional characteristics for cash effective tax rate 
reported in Dyreng et al. (2008). The mean (median) for the GAAP effective tax rate is 29.2 
percent (30.9 percent), which is also consistent with the distributional characteristics for GAAP 
effective tax rates of prior literature (see e.g. Dyreng et al. 2010). The mean for book-tax 
differences (BTD) is positive, which means that the average firm in my sample reports more 
financial accounting income than taxable income. Also, the average firm in my sample engages 
in conforming tax avoidance, which is reflected in the positive values of CONFORMING_TAX. 
The mean (median) value of institutional ownership is 56.4 percent (65.8 percent), which is 
consistent with the average level of institutional ownership of samples used in prior research 
(e.g. Khurana and Moser 2013, Ali et al. 2008). The median firm in my sample is profitable 
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with a PI scaled by assets of 8.7 percent, and is moderately leveraged with a debt-to-asset ratio 
of 15.1 percent. 59.4 percent of firms in my sample have tax loss carryforwards from prior years, 
which is quite a large representation. The explanation could be that my sample period represents 
time after financial crisis that started 2007-2008. 
The median firm in my sample is a growing firm, generating 8.7 percent more sales in each year. 
Also, the median firm in my sample has 19.8 percent of property, plant and equipment of total 
assets, and 14.5 percent of intangible assets of total assets. The share of intangibles is rather 
high compared to the samples of prior research, which makes sense since intangible assets have 
become increasingly important today. 
The mean (median) values for different expenditures of sales are 3.6 percent (0.0 percent) for 
research and development, 1.2 percent (0.0 percent) for advertisement, 24.9 percent (20.2 
percent) for capital, and 22.7 percent (19.2 percent) for selling, general and administrative. 
Table 4 Panel B provides descriptive statistics for input variables used in the regression 
estimation of CONFORMING_TAX. 
Table 4 Panel C compares industry characteristics of my sample to those of the unprocessed 
Compustat population in fiscal year 2011, which is the year that has the largest representation 
in my sample. The industry groups are based on the Barth et al. (1998) industry groups, and as 
it should be, financial services, real estate and insurance companies (SIC codes 6000-6999) and 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are not present in my sample. The comparison between my 
sample and that of the Compustat population is to get a sense of whether my sample is somehow 
different, which could limit generalizability. I find my sample to represent the division of the 
Compustat population quite well.  
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TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics           
  
n 
Std. 
dev. 
25th 
pctl. Mean Median 
75th 
pctl. 
Tax position             
CASH_ETR 8624 0.216 0.095 0.255 0.230 0.341 
GAAP_ETR 8624 0.181 0.198 0.292 0.309 0.371 
BTD 6686 0.087 0.006 0.038 0.026 0.054 
CONFORMING_TAX 6686 0.036 0.012 0.032 0.024 0.043 
Test variables 
            
InstOwn 8624 0.323 0.272 0.564 0.658 0.839 
InstOwnNumber_dum 8624 0.406 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.000 
Control variables 
            
PI 8624 0.127 0.049 0.114 0.087 0.145 
LEV 8624 0.259 0.002 0.207 0.151 0.306 
NOL_dum 8624 0.491 0.000 0.594 1.000 1.000 
SIZE 8624 2.089 5.826 7.187 7.230 8.546 
∆SALES 8624 0.491 -0.005 0.116 0.065 0.161 
CASH_HOLD 8624 0.170 0.046 0.172 0.117 0.243 
PPE 8624 0.278 0.088 0.287 0.198 0.403 
INTANG 8624 0.268 0.028 0.224 0.145 0.345 
FORINC_dum 8624 0.498 0.000 0.547 1.000 1.000 
EQINC_dum 8624 0.474 0.000 0.342 0.000 1.000 
CAPEX 8624 0.264 0.129 0.249 0.202 0.316 
ADVEX 8624 0.031 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.008 
RDEX 8624 0.077 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.039 
SGAEX 8624 0.186 0.094 0.227 0.192 0.323 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for input variables for estimation of CONFORMING_TAX 
  
n Std. dev. 
25th 
pctl. 
Mean Median 
75th 
pctl. 
Tax position             
TAXESPAID_TO_ASSETS 6686 0.036 0.005 0.027 0.018 0.038 
Control variables 
            
BTD 6686 0.087 0.006 0.038 0.026 0.054 
NEG_Dum 6686 0.384 0.000 0.180 0.000 
 
0.000 
BTD*NEG 6686 0.024 0.006 -0.005 0.026 0.054 
NOL_Dum 6686 0.487 0.000 0.612 1.000 1.000 
∆NOL 6686 0.020 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
SALES_TO_NOA 6686 4.508 1.051 2.786 1.819 3.083 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics       
  SIC codes Sample%  Compustat% 
Industry       
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 100-999 0.13 0.29 
Mining and construction 1000-1299, 1400-1999 2.15 2.81 
Food 2000-2111 2.40 1.58 
Textiles, printing and publishing 2200-2799 5.05 1.93 
Chemicals 2800-2824, 2837-2899 5.68 1.75 
Pharmaceuticals 2830-2836 3.54 7.95 
Extractive industries 1300-1399, 2900-2999 2.27 3.81 
Durable manufacturers 3000-3569, 3580-3669, 3680-3999 29.92 11.77 
Computers 3570-3579, 3670-3679, 7370-7379 23.86 10.21 
Transportation 4000-4899 4.17 4.18 
Utilities 4900-4999 0.00 3.70 
Retail 5000-5999 10.23 5.31 
Financial institutions 6000-6411 0.00 11.42 
Insurance and real estate 6500-6999 0.00 26.82 
Services 7000-7369, 7380-8999 9.97 5.50 
Other 9000-9999 0.63 0.97 
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6.2 Correlations 
The chapter compounds correlations among the variables. 
Table 5 presents Pearson correlations among the variables used in my regression model. The 
book-tax difference measure is negatively correlated with the effective tax rate measures. The 
conforming tax avoidance measure is positively correlated with the effective tax rate measures. 
Moreover, the correlations of the tax avoidance measures with institutional ownership measures 
(continuous variable InstOwn and the indicator variable InstOwnNumber_dum) are statistically 
significant except the correlation between the CASH_ETR and InstOwn is not statistically 
significant. 
TABLE 5. Correlation matrix of the variables 
 
Panel A: Correlation variables CASH_ETR  to SIZE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 CASH_ETR 1.000
2 GAAP_ETR 0.404 1.000
3 BTD -0.347 -0.284 1.000
4 CONFORMING_TAX 0.293 0.126 0.001 1.000
5 InstOwn 0.014 0.080 -0.122 0.080 1.000
6 InstOwnNumber_dum -0.032 -0.063 0.085 -0.070 -0.664 1.000
7 PI -0.100 -0.072 0.580 0.676 0.011 -0.029 1.000
8 LEV -0.069 -0.024* 0.018 -0.066 0.120 -0.147 -0.056 1.000
9 NOL_dum -0.049 -0.015 -0.006 -0.010 0.121 -0.110 -0.079 0.049 1.000
10 SIZE 0.025* -0.031 -0.042 0.134 0.237 -0.491 0.048 0.171 0.057 1.000
11 ∆SALES -0.096 -0.051 0.141 0.081 -0.002 -0.004 0.150 0.058 0.011 -0.021
12 CASH_HOLD -0.052 -0.092 0.127 0.097 -0.031 0.050 0.241 -0.310 0.038 -0.124
13 PPE -0.126 -0.022* 0.081 -0.076 -0.078 -0.018 -0.018 0.319 -0.115 0.081
14 INTANG 0.043 0.024* -0.058 0.030* 0.168 -0.149 -0.018 0.372 0.116 0.170
15 EQINC_dum 0.021* -0.028 -0.022 -0.077 -0.118 -0.063 -0.104 0.108 0.002 0.391
16 FORINC_dum 0.090 -0.004 -0.110 -0.022 0.361 -0.272 -0.058 -0.031 0.215 0.172
17 CAPEX -0.007 0.009 0.032 0.029* 0.036 -0.039 0.071 -0.081 0.061 0.004
18 ADVEX 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.058 0.029 -0.054 0.042 0.009 0.021* 0.077
19 RDEX -0.076 -0.127 0.166 -0.063 0.036 -0.038 0.074 -0.146 0.093 0.034
20 SGAEX 0.002 -0.023* 0.037 0.014 0.028 0.028 0.073 -0.177 0.093 -0.106
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6.3 Regression results 
This chapter can be argued to be one of the most important in my thesis as it presents the 
regression results. I will start by showing the figures of the regression results. Then, I go to the 
analysis and proceed the subject areas as follows: institutional shareholders and nonconforming 
tax avoidance, institutional shareholders and conforming tax avoidance, and number of 
institutional shareholders and corporate tax avoidance.  
Table 6 presents the results from the regression estimation. I estimate the model using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression with CASH_ETR, GAAP_ETR, BTD and CONFORMING_TAX 
as the dependent variables. In all estimations year and industry fixed effects are included, but I 
do not report their coefficients for brevity. The explanatory power of the equation ranges from 
0.05 to 0.55. Firms that engage in more tax avoidance practices have lower effective tax rates -
that is to say, the coefficients are negative (-) in the following table – and higher levels for the 
BTD and CONFORMING_TAX, reflected as positive coefficients (+).  
Panel B: Correlation variables ∆SALES  to SGAEX
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
11 ∆SALES 1.000
12 CASH_HOLD 0.114 1.000
13 PPE 0.070 -0.327 1.000
14 INTANG 0.056 -0.218 -0.256 1.000
15 EQINC_dum -0.065 -0.193 0.110 -0.016 1.000
16 FORINC_dum -0.020 0.084 -0.274 0.143 -0.011 1.000
17 CAPEX 0.048 0.160 -0.160 0.058 -0.067 0.046 1.000
18 ADVEX -0.001 0.106 -0.092 0.069 -0.033 0.039 0.099 1.000
19 RDEX 0.104 0.428 -0.255 0.040 -0.092 0.177 0.120 0.010 1.000
20 SGAEX -0.001 0.376 -0.347 0.123 -0.201 0.158 0.172 0.290 0.527 1.000
Correlation values in bold indicate significance at 1 percent, except 
values in bold with asterisk(*) indicate significance at 5 percent. 
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TABLE 6. Regression results 
  CASH_ETR GAAP_ETR BTD CONFORMING_TAX 
Intercept 0.343 0.325 0.038 -0.019 
  (9.286) (10.359) (1.950) -(2.665) 
InstOwn -0.038 0.031 -0.017 0.011 
  -(3.709) (3.585) -(3.963) (7.208) 
InstOwnNumber_dum -0.028 -0.031 0.003 -0.001 
  -(3.279) -(4.392) (0.915) -(0.742) 
PI -0.157 -0.081 0.427 0.195 
  -(8.262) -(5.008) (59.060) (75.117) 
LEV -0.059 -0.047 0.026 -0.008 
  -(5.425) -(5.091) (6.155) -(5.539) 
NOL_dum -0.034 -0.007 0.013 0.004 
  -(7.188) -(1.716) (7.351) (6.435) 
SIZE 0.001 -0.006 -0.004 0.000 
  (0.990) -(4.533) -(6.448) (0.723) 
∆SALES -0.025 -0.007 0.005 -0.001 
  -(5.227) -(1.847) (2.357) -(1.868) 
CASH_HOLD -0.022 -0.059 -0.027 -0.003 
  -(1.198) -(3.821) -(4.064) -(1.130) 
PPE -0.089 -0.037 0.018 -0.005 
  -(7.830) -(3.841) (4.141) -(3.058) 
INTANG 0.039 0.016 -0.014 0.004 
  (3.531) (1.707) -(3.401) (2.594) 
EQINC_dum 0.004 -0.006 0.007 -0.002 
  (0.673) -(1.184) (3.599) -(2.116) 
FORINC_dum 0.039 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 
  (7.163) -(0.653) -(1.855) (1.847) 
CAPEX -0.002 0.011 -0.011 -0.003 
  -(0.263) (1.452) -(2.333) -(1.907) 
ADV -0.083 -0.045 0.053 0.002 
  -(1.064) -(0.685) (1.878) (0.244) 
RD -0.274 -0.262 0.231 -0.067 
  -(6.965) -(7.862) (16.860) -(13.456) 
SGA 0.039 0.052 -0.024 0.002 
  (2.369) (3.805) -(3.749) (1.046) 
Adjusted R2 7.23 % 4.75 % 40.36 % 54.67 % 
Observations 8,624 8,624 6,686 6,686 
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6.3.1 Nonconforming tax avoidance 
In this chapter, when I talk about “effect of institutional ownership” or something 
corresponding, I refer to the relationship between the fraction of the firm held by institutions 
and the firm’s tax avoidance. Specifically, the relationship is tested by the test variable InstOwn 
in relation to the dependent variables CASH_ETR, GAAP_ETR and BTD. 
The results are mixed for the effect of institutional ownership on nonconforming corporate tax 
avoidance. As the share of the institutional ownership increases, the CASH_ETR shows 
increased nonconforming tax avoidance. However, the GAAP_ETR and BTD indicate the 
adverse: as the share of institutional ownership increases, the firms employ less nonconforming 
tax avoidance practices. The reason behind the contradictory results could be that the variables 
measure different type of nonconforming tax avoidance. As earlier discussed, whereas the 
GAAP_ETR and BTD reflect tax accounting accruals, CASH_ETR does not. Also, Mills (1998) 
documents evidence that firms with large BTD are more likely to be audited by the IRS. This 
could lead to a situation where firms try to avoid such tax planning practices where the outcome 
is easily observable by the authorities. CASH_ETR is not straightly computable by jurisdiction 
in contrast to GAAP_ETR and BTD (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). 
The annual CASH_ETR may also reflect taxes paid on earnings in a different period if, for 
instance, an IRS audit is completed in the current year (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). So, as the 
measure is more volatile for year-to-year changes, the other two nonconforming tax avoidance 
measures could be more reliable. Long-run cash ETR would work for testing the reliability of 
the CASH_ETR (Dyreng et al. 2008). 
As it has been argued in prior research, the one year CASH_ETR is the most volatile, and thus 
the most unreliable measure of the all nonconforming tax avoidance measures used in my tests, 
I could interpret the results to give a slight support to the hypotheses 1b. 
The result is consistent with that of Khurana and Moser (2013), but opposite to those of Bird 
and Karolyi (2017), Chen et al. (2015), and Khan et al. (2016). However, more tests are needed 
in order to reach a clearer conclusion.  
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The control variables indicate that profitable (PI) and growing (∆SALES) firms, and firms with 
more property, plant and equipment in their balance sheets (PPE) tend to avoid more taxes. 
These results are pretty much as expected. The more profitable the firm, the more it benefits 
from tax avoidance in absolute dollars. High growth firms, on the other hand, have more 
investments that create increased book-tax differences. Firms with more property, plant and 
equipment to assets tend to have higher depreciations and, therefore, avoid more taxes. 
I did not predict the signs of the coefficients related to ADVEX and RDEX, but the results show 
that firms with more advertisement (ADVEX) and R&D (RDEX) expenses tend to avoid more 
taxes. 
Moreover, leveraged (LEV) firms tend to avoid more taxes. The result is opposite to what was 
expected. Leveraged firms should have a tax shield, which lowers the incentives to engage in 
tax avoidance activities. One possible explanation for the opposing results could be that firms 
with more debt need more cash for paying interests and amortizing the principal, which, in turn, 
could create an incentive to avoid taxes and tax payments.   
The result of the firms with loss carryforwards (NOL_dum) engaging in more tax avoidance is 
both interesting and not as predicted. However, as was seen in the descriptive statistics, almost 
sixty percent of the firms in my sample have loss carryforwards available in the beginning of 
the year. The corresponding percentage values in the respective empirical researches is closer 
to thirty percent (see e.g. Khurana and Moser 2013). The difference is probably due that my 
sample represents time straight after a recession period. In that kind of situation, loss 
carryforwards may not be a good indicator of firms’ tax avoidance behavior. 
Firms with more intangible assets (INTANG) in their balance sheets, and firms with more 
selling, general and administrative expenses (SGAEX) avoid less taxes. 
Finally, signs for cash holdings (CASH_HOLD), firm size (SIZE), equity income (EQINC_dum), 
foreign income (FORINC_dum), and capital expenditure (CAPEX) are mixed and depend on the 
specification. 
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6.3.2 Conforming tax avoidance 
In this chapter - similarly to the previous chapter - when I talk about “effect of institutional 
ownership” or something corresponding, I refer to the relationship between the fraction of the 
firm held by institutions and the firm’s tax avoidance. Specifically, the relationship is tested by 
the test variable InstOwn in relation to the dependent variable CONFORMING_TAX. 
The CONFORMING_TAX indicates that firms with a greater institutional ownership portion 
engage in more conforming tax avoidance as the relationship is positive (0.011) and statistically 
significant. In other words, I find evidence to support the hypothesis H2a. 
Moreover, the results indicate that profitable (PI) firms, and also firms with loss carryforwards 
available in the beginning of the year (NOL_dum), firms with more intangibles in their balance 
sheets (INTANG), and firms with foreign income (FORINC_dum) and more selling, general and 
administrative expenses (SGAEX) tend to engage in more conforming tax avoidance. 
If I take a comprehensive picture with both nonconforming and conforming tax avoidance 
behaviors, only two kinds of firms engage in both kinds of tax avoidance: profitable firms and 
firms with loss carry forwards available in the beginning of the year. Growing and leveraged 
firms, firms with more property, plant and equipment or intangibles to assets, and firms with 
more advertisement, R&D or sales, general and administrative expenditures engage adversely 
in nonconforming and conforming tax avoidance. That is to say, if the firm engages more in 
nonconforming tax avoidance, it engages less in conforming tax avoidance. 
6.3.3 Number of institutional owners 
The results for the test variable InstOwnNumber_dum are intriguing. If the firm has less than 
forty different institutional shareholders, the firm engages in more nonconforming tax avoidance 
as reflected by the negative values for the CASH_ETR and GAAP_ETR and the positive value 
for the BTD, and slightly less in conforming tax avoidance as reflected by the negative value for 
the CONFORMING_TAX. The result is quite consistent with my expectations, and the H3 gets 
support. 
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However, I did not predict conforming tax avoidance to differ from nonconforming tax 
avoidance. So, after all, there are two different outcomes which can be stated as follows: 
1. Firms with multiple institutional shareholders exhibit lower levels of nonconforming tax 
avoidance 
2. Firms with multiple institutional shareholders exhibit higher levels of conforming tax 
avoidance 
The first outcome can be reasoned by the argument that firms with multiple blockholders may 
have a free-rider problem. The results indicate that when there are mutliple insitutional 
shareholders in one firm, the characteristic of institutions being superior monitorers and 
information gatherers melts away. In that case each institutional investor individually has 
insuffiecien incentives to bear the cost of monitoring. In other words, a firm with few enough 
number of different institutional shareholders is more closely monitored than a firm with 
multiple number of different institutional shareholders. The firm with fewer shareholders 
benefits from the monitoring and knowledgeble institutional shareholders in a way that leads to 
more effective tax planning or tax avoidance. 
It is more difficult to say whether the second result - that firms with multiple institutional 
shareholders engage in more conforming tax avoidance - tells something about monitoring. It 
could be considered that the managers of the firm with fewer number of institutional owners 
become aware of the monitoring, or that the monitoring itself means changing the management 
incentives which, in turn, affects the firm’s conforming tax avoidance. Prior research (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976, Rego and Wilson 2012) assumes that firms write equity-based contracts to 
align managerial incentives with those of shareholders. More conscious managers may want to 
create better-looking profits to create value for the firm, and not to lower the financial income 
by conforming tax avoidance.  
6.4 Robustness tests 
In order to test the robustness of the results, I employ few additional tests. First, I replicate the 
regression estimation but only with few control variables. Second, I calculate BTD similarly to 
Manzon and Plesko (2002), and run the regression estimation for it. 
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6.4.1 Regression estimation with a minimal set of control variables 
I repeat the tests with only few control variables: profitability (PI), size (SIZE), and year and 
industry fixed effects. This is similar to the robustness tests conducted by prior research (see 
Dyreng et al. 2010). 
Table 7 presents the results of the regression estimation with a minimal set of control variables. 
TABLE 7. Regression results with a minimal set of control variables 
  CASH_ETR GAAP_ETR BTD 
CONFORMING_ 
TAX 
Intercept 0.283 0.315 0.011 -0.020 
  (7.726) (10.231) (0.561) -(2.756) 
InstOwn -0.017 0.033 -0.025 0.013 
  -(1.698) (4.007) -(5.981) (8.502) 
InstOwnNumber_dum -0.016 -0.021 0.009 0.000 
  -(1.929) -(2.967) (2.447) (0.116) 
PI -0.166 -0.106 0.412 0.191 
  -(8.886) -(6.776) (58.262) (75.179) 
SIZE 0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.000 
  (3.228) -(4.569) (1.462) (0.415) 
Adjusted R2 3.22 % 2.95 % 36.01 % 52.43 % 
Observations 8,624 8,624 6,686 6,686 
 
As can be seen, I keep finding very similar results.  
6.4.2 Manzon and Plesko (2002) book-tax difference 
I chose to use the book-tax difference as one of my measures for nonconforming tax avoidance. 
I measured it similarly to Mills 1998, Desai 2003 and Badertscher et al. 2016. However, most 
of the recent studies have used either BTD measured similarly to Manzon and Plesko (2002) or 
Rego and Wilson (2012). I conduct an additional test with Manzon and Plesko’s BTD measure, 
from now on MP_BTD, to verify my results concerning the BTD. The MP_BTD is calculated 
as U.S. domestic financial income less U.S. domestic taxable income less state income taxes 
less equity in earnings and dividing the result by lagged total assets. U.S domestic taxable 
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income is estimated as the federal tax expense divided by the statutory corporate tax rate. I 
remove observations with negative federal taxable income - the sample now consists of 3,742 
observations for the MP_BTD regression estimation. 
The regression estimation where MP_BTD is the dependent variable gives similar results to the 
earlier used BTD; there should be no reliability problems in that sense regarding the use of BTD 
calculated similarly to Mills 1998, Desai 2003 and Badertscher et al. 2016. The results are shown 
in the APPENDIX 2. The only interesting difference is that the MP_BTD show decreased tax 
avoidance as the coefficient for InstOwn is positive (0.002). Albeit, the coefficient is small and 
not significant, and the test sample is limited, it still makes the results of nonconforming tax 
avoidance – specifically, the relationship of the fraction of the firm held by institutions and the 
firm’s nonconforming tax avoidance - even more vague. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The final chapter will summarize the most important conclusions and present the contributions 
that I have made in this thesis. I will also suggest some future research topics. The core question 
of this thesis was: “Do institutional shareholders affect corporate tax avoidance?” Further 
hypotheses were drawn based on the prior research: 
H1a: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit higher levels of nonconforming tax 
avoidance. 
H1b: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit lower levels of nonconforming tax 
avoidance. 
H2a: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit higher levels of conforming tax 
avoidance. 
H2b: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit lower levels of conforming tax 
avoidance. 
H3: Firms with multiple institutional shareholders exhibit lower levels of tax avoidance. 
As the research field is rather young – the most important papers concerning the topic are from 
2010s – the causes and effects are not yet stable or established. This is also what makes the topic 
so intriguing.  
7.1 Key findings 
I find a slight evidence to support the H1a: Firms with more institutional investors exhibit higher 
levels of nonconforming tax avoidance. Two of my measures, GAAP_ETR and BTD, show 
decreased tax avoidance the more the firm is owned by institutions. CASH_ETR, on the other 
hand, suggest the opposite relation, but it can be argued that the measure may be volatile in the 
short term, reflecting taxes paid on earnings in a different period. However, Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) state that the CASH_ETR is not easily observable by jurisdictions in contrast 
to the GAAP_ETR and BTD. Then, it could also be argued that firms try not to stand out in the 
eyes of tax jurisdiction. Hence, they want to keep the easily observable tax measures - that is to 
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say, GAAP_ETR and BTD - to show figures that prove the firm to be a good tax payer. In that 
case, the CASH_ETR could give more reliable results. Anyway, more research is needed to argue 
more strongly on behalf of any relation. 
When it comes to the conforming tax avoidance, my results suggest that institutional 
shareholders are slightly associated with corporate conforming tax avoidance. This result 
indicates that creating value in the form of saved money in tax payments is more important than 
creating high profits. However, the results do not give any hint what the reason behind could 
be. For instance, it does not tell who gives more value for the tax savings than high financial 
accounting profits – is it the management of the company or the (institutional) shareholders of 
the company? It could also be possible that conforming tax avoidance is exhibited only in 
specific situations in which the tax avoidance activities do not lead in psychologically significant 
differences in the reported profits. In their international study of cosmetic earnings management 
(CEM), Kinnunen and Koskela (2003) found evidence that if the second digit of the firm’s net 
income was nine, the firm tends to do CEM to get the first digit increase by one. For instance, 
if the profit of the company is going to be 2.96 million dollars, it is better to get it above 3 
million. On the other hand, if the profit is 2.12 million, maybe tax savings in forms of 
conforming tax avoidance is value creating as far as the profit level stays above 2 million. 
However, this is pure analysis and guessing without better knowledge; a different and more 
specific research design is needed to truly verify anything.  
Then, the results suggest that firms with less than forty different institutional shareholders 
exhibit higher levels of nonconforming tax avoidance It is consistent with my expectations that 
firms with fewer blockholders are less exposed to the free-rider problem, and hence those firms 
benefit more from the knowledgeable institutional shareholders and their monitoring of the 
firms’ managers. Also, those firms with less than forty different institutional shareholders 
engage in less conforming tax avoidance. This could be interpreted as giving some insight into 
the results of institutional shareholders being associated with corporate conforming tax 
avoidance in general. With less blockholders, and thus with more powerful monitoring, the firms 
do not engage that much in conforming tax avoidance. So, after all, it may be the managers, and 
lack of monitoring, that brings the firms to engage in more conforming tax avoidance. Then, 
again, it could be asked why the managers would like their firms to engage in conforming tax 
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avoidance. The answer could be related to inadequate incentives (see e.g. Rego and Wilson 
2012), need for cash especially after the financial crisis, or maybe taking a big bath before the 
good years.   
7.2 Contributions to the existing literature 
In the introduction chapter I stated that my study aims to give further understanding about the 
impact of ownership on corporate tax practices by studying the role of institutional owners. 
There were three aspects to motivate me in the journey: (1) the contradictory results of prior 
corporate tax avoidance and institutional investor research, (2) the increasing share of 
institutional owners, and (3) the public concern of institutional investors being bad owners. 
With my research, I have contributed to the literature about the relationship of corporate tax 
avoidance and institutional investors by two main ways. First, compared to prior research, my 
study has a broader perspective than any other studies before to the best of my knowledge. By 
including both conforming and nonconforming tax avoidance measures to my research design, 
I am able to catch the whole picture of the firm’s tax avoidance activities. Prior studies have 
mainly focused on nonconforming tax avoidance, taking into account only measures that count 
for nonconforming tax avoidance. For instance, the study of Chen et al. (2010) was criticized 
by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for interpreting the results without taking into account the 
possibility of conforming tax avoidance. The same concern would possibly be addressed for 
many other research papers to some extent as most of them do not consider conforming tax 
avoidance at all. Analyzing results of such studies that have focused merely on noncorming tax 
avoidance may tell only half ot the truth about corporate tax avoidance. 
Second, I could not find any papers that would have tested the relationship of number of 
institutional shareholders and corporate tax avoidance. The results are intriguing as they show 
that number of blockholders can significantly explain the relationship between institutional 
owners and their portfolio firms’ tax avoidance. The number of institutional blockholders as a 
test variable could also solve some contrdictory results that have occurred in prior research. For 
instance, if included in the research desing of the studies of Chen et al. (2015), Khan et al. 
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(2016), and Bird and Karolyi (2017), the test variable could streamline the results concerning 
the use of tax shelters or the effect of corporate governance on tax avoidance. 
7.3 Managerial implications 
Based on this thesis there are the following managerial implications that can be concluded.  
My study should be helpful in understanding the complexity of the corporate tax avoidance 
practices. As most of the academic research papers try to be very concise in what they state in 
order to keep the papers to their scope, thesis has more freedom in that sense. In a normal case, 
Master’s theses are of between 60 and 100 pages of length, whereas research papers usually 
tend to stay in less than 30 pages, just to give a rought estimation. So, a thesis can be more 
verbose and thus more easily understandable than advanced academical papers. That was also 
the aim of this thesis. Another advantage of this thesis is that it’s writer – that is to say, I – is 
not a pure academic, but a student and a worker in the field of accounting. I have tried to explain 
the concepts and definitions so that they would be understandable also in a mangerial or 
practicioner perspective. The figures in the theoretical review were merely developed to 
simplify the complex picture. I hope the reader experiences it that way. As the American author 
Natalie Babbit has stated: 
“Like all magnificent things, it’s very simple”.  
On a company-level, my thesis should help the stakeholders of companies to understand what 
the number of the company’s different institutional blockholders can mean. The interests of the 
stakeholders differ significantly as the state wants to collect taxes, the public (e.g. regular people 
or jounalists) wants the firm to pay its taxes fairly, the management of the firm wants to do tax 
planning in a way that maximizes their incentives, the shareholders want to maximize the value 
of the company, and so forth. The different stakeholders could understand each other better if 
they saw the meaning of the number of institutional blockholders.  For instance, the state and 
the jurisdiction could monitor firms differently based on the number of the firm’s institutional 
blockholders, or the boards of the companies could design incentives for the firm’s institutional 
shareholders to monitor and bring knowledge to the company. The latter idea is somehow 
supported by the study of McGuire et al. (2014) who find that that dual-class stocks differ from 
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other companies when it comes to tax avoidance. Even that the result shows that such dual-class 
stocks engage in less tax avoidance, with some stock design, the reverse – effective tax planning 
– could be possible. 
7.4. Suggestions for future research  
The results of this thesis have raised many interesting and important subjects for further 
research. First and foremost, it would be good to understand the specific ways by which the 
companies do effective tax planning. The field of tax avoidance research is rather active, but a 
major part of the researches has focused on studying large samples with quantitative methods. 
Qualitative studies with interviews and inquiries could offer new insight into the causes and 
effects, and give understanding to make better-designed quantitative studies. Specific research 
questions could be such as (1) how institutional shareholders use their knowledge to make the 
firms exhibit different levels of tax avoidance, (2) what are the ways of the firm’s management 
to do effective tax planning and (3) how do the ways of tax planning differ in different situations. 
Another interesting track could be to study the relation between conforming tax avoidance and 
some other fundamental accounting concepts. For instance, it would be appealing to know 
whether taking a big bath or cosmetic earnings management has something to do with 
conforming tax avoidance. 
There is also still need for more research designs resembling this thesis, because of the 
contradictory results of both prior research and this thesis. It would not be a bad idea to replicate 
the research design of my thesis to some extent, but to include long-term tax avoidance measures 
to be able to control volatility of the measures, especially the volatility of the CASH_ETR. 
Another variation to the design could be to perform quantile regressions based on Armstrong et 
al. (2015), which could give more insight into the variation of the firms’ tax avoidance. An 
example research question could be: do firms with less than forty different institutional owners 
engage in aggressive tax avoidance. 
Furthermore, alternatives to ETRs, effective tax rates, would be welcome. ETRs are intuitive, 
easily understandable measures, but they have the drawback in short term: they can be used only 
for firms with positive pretax income. As discussed earlier in this thesis, excluding firms with 
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negative book income is an artificial choice, especially in the times of crisis when a greater part 
of the firms is not making profit. 
Finally, a major part of the prior research, as well as this thesis, focuses on institutional investors 
as a group. Even if there has been papers about a specific group of institutional investors (e.g. 
Chen et al. 2015), they have compared that specific group of institutional investors to the rest of 
the companies. None has yet performed any wider comparative studies to my knowledge. That 
kind of study design could compare, for instance, tax avoidance of firms owned by pension 
funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and hedge funds, or divide institutions based on their 
past trading behavior similarly to Bushee (1998). 
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APPENDIX 1. Panel A. All variable definitions. 
 
ADVEX Advertisement expenditure (XADV) divided by net sales (SALE) XAD / SALE
BTD Book-tax differences; Book income (PI) less taxable income 
[(TXFED+TXFO)/STR - ∆NOL]
PI - [(TXFED+TXFO) / 
STR - ∆NOL]
BTD*NEG BTD multiplied by NEG BTD * NEG
CASH_ETR Firm's cash effective tax rate, which equals cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided 
by pretax net income (PI). CASH_ETR  is set to missing when the 
denominator is zero or negative. CASH_ETR  is winsorized to the range [0, 
1].
TXPD / PI
CASH_HOLD Cash and short-term investments (CHE) scaled by total assets (AT) CHE / AT
CAPEX Capital expenditure (CAPX) divided by net sales (SALE) CAPX / SALE
CONFORM_TAX The residual from equation TAXESPAID_TO_ASSETS ε
∆NOL Change in the firm's net operating loss carryforwards (TLCF) available at 
the beginning of year t divided by total assets at the beginning of the year t
(TLCFt-1 - TLCFt-2) / Att-1
∆SALES Sales (SALE) divided by sales of the previous year (SALEt-1) minus one. SALEt / SALEt-1 - 1
EQINC_dum An indicator if the firm has equity income in earnings (ESUB)
FORINC_dum An indicator if the firm has a non-zero, non-missing value for pre-tax income 
from foreign operations (PIFO)
GAAP_ETR Firm's effective tax rate, which equals total tax expense (TXT) divided by 
pre-tax income (PI). GAAP_ETR  is set to missing when the denominator is 
zero or negative. GAAP_ETR  is winsorized to the range [0, 1].
TXT / PI
InstOwn The average percentage of a firm's stock owned by institutional 
shareholders in year t
meanSHARES / (CSHO * 
1,000,000)
InstOwnNumber _dum An indicator if the firm's stock is owned by less than 40 different institutions
INTANG Intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by lagged assets (ATt-1) INTAN / ATt-1
LEV Leverage; long-term debt scaled by lagged assets (ATt-1) DLTT / ATt-1
MP_BTD [Domestic financial income (PIDOM) - domestic taxable income 
(TXFED/TXT) - state income taxes (TXS) - other income taxes (TXO) less 
equity in earnings (ESUB)] divided by lagged total assets (ATt-1)
(PIDOM - TXFED / STR 
- TXS - TXO - ESUB) / 
ATt-1
NEG_dum An indicator if the firm's book-tax difference is negative
NOL_dum An indicator if the firm has a non-zero, non-missing value for net operating 
loss carry forwards (TLCF) in the beginning of the year
PI Pretax income (PI) scaled by lagged assets (ATt-1) PI / ATt-1
PPE Net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) scaled by lagged assets (ATt-1) PPENT / ATt-1
RDEX Research and development expenditure (XRD) divided by net sales (SALE) XRD / SALE
SALES_TO_NOA Sales (SALE) at the end of year divided by net operating assets (SEQ-
CHE+DLC+DLTT) at the end of year
SALE / (SEQ-
CHE+DLC+DLTT)
SGAEX Sales, general and administrative expenditure (XSGA) divided by net sales 
(SALE)
XSGA / SALE
SIZE Natural logarithm of assets (AT) ln(AT)
TAXES_PAIDTO_
ASSETS
Firm's cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by total assets at the beginning of 
year t.
TXPD / ATt 
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APPENDIX 1. Panel B. All data items used in calculations. 
From 
Compustat 
Abbreviation Description 
x AT Assets - Total 
x* AT_lagged Lagged Assets - Total 
x CAPX Capital expenditure 
x CEQ Common/Ordinary Equity - Total 
x* CEQ_lagged Lagged Common/Ordinary Equity - Total 
x CHE Cash and Short-Term Investments 
x CSHO Common Shares Outstanding Million 
x DLC Debt in Current Liabilities - Total 
x DLTT Long-Term Debt - Total 
x ESUB Equity in Earnings - Unconsolidated Subsidiaries 
x INTAN Intangible Assets - Total 
  meanSHARES Number of shares owned by institutional investors, the year mean 
x PI Pretax Income 
x PIDOM Domestic Financial income 
x PIFO Pretax Income - Foreign 
x PPENT Property, Plant and Equipment - Total (Net) 
x PRCC_F Price Close - Annual - Fiscal 
x SALE Sales/Turnover (Net) 
x SEQ Stockholders Equity - Parent 
  STR United States Statutory Tax Rate 
x STX State Income Taxes 
x TLCF Tax Loss Carry Forward 
x* TLCF_lagged Lagged Tax Loss Carry Forward 
x TXDI Income Taxes - Deferred 
x TXFED Income Taxes - Federal 
x TXFO Income Taxes - Foreign 
x TXO Income Taxes - Other 
x TXPD Income Taxes Paid 
x TXS Income Taxes - State 
x TXT Income Taxes - Total 
x XAD Advertisement expenditure 
x XI Extraordinary Items 
x XRD Research and development expenditure 
x XSGA Sales, general and administrative expenditure 
* Lagged measure of the Compustat data item, not straightly downloadable 
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APPENDIX 2. Result comparison of BTD and MP_BTD. 
  BTD MP_BTD 
Intercept 0.038 0.023 
  (1.950) (1.059) 
InstOwn -0.017 0.002 
  -(3.963) (0.569) 
InstOwnNumber_dum 0.003 0.003 
  (0.915) (0.964) 
PI 0.427 0.093 
  (59.060) (10.628) 
LEV 0.026 -0.005 
  (6.155) -(1.091) 
NOL_dum 0.013 0.009 
  (7.351) (5.360) 
SIZE -0.004 -0.003 
  -(6.448) -(4.079) 
∆SALES 0.005 0.005 
  (2.357) (2.261) 
CASH_HOLD -0.027 -0.005 
  -(4.064) -(0.794) 
PPE 0.018 0.009 
  (4.141) (1.312) 
INTANG -0.014 -0.003 
  -(3.401) -(0.779) 
EQINC_dum 0.007 0.001 
  (3.599) (0.319) 
FORINC_dum -0.004 -0.019 
  -(1.855) -(5.386) 
CAPEX -0.011 0.015 
  -(2.333) (0.672) 
ADV 0.053 0.055 
  (1.878) (2.294) 
RD 0.231 0.059 
  (16.860) (3.850) 
SGA -0.024 -0.019 
  -(3.749) -(3.014) 
Adjusted R2 40.36 % 7.24 % 
Observations 6,686 3,742 
 
